mcp-to-skill
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 16, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill instructions direct the agent to read local configuration files to extract server connection details and tool definitions.
- Evidence:
SKILL.md(Phase 1) lists paths such as~/Library/Application Support/Claude/claude_desktop_config.json,~/.claude/settings.json, and.cursor/mcp.json. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The workflow involves running a local Python script for analysis and provides templates for generating shell command sequences.
- Evidence:
SKILL.md(Phase 5) instructs the agent to execute the providedscripts/estimate_tokens.pyscript. - Evidence:
references/replacement-patterns.mdcontains templates for executingbash,curl, and various CLI tools. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation provides instructions for acquiring well-known CLI utilities from their official sources.
- Evidence:
references/environment-guide.mdincludes a "CLI Installation Quick Reference" with commands for installing tools likegh,aws, andkubectlusingbreworapt. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill provides patterns for processing data retrieved from remote URLs which can involve execution in a local shell or script environment.
- Evidence:
references/replacement-patterns.mdincludes examples of pipingcurloutputs intojqorpython3for processing and transformation. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The instructions contain meta-directives designed to influence the behavior of the platform's skill selection and triggering logic for the generated output.
- Evidence:
SKILL.md(Phase 4) explicitly instructs the agent to create "pushy" descriptions and "aggressive triggers" in the generated skill's frontmatter. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents an attack surface for indirect prompt injection as it processes untrusted data from external sources and local files without explicit sanitization or boundary markers.
- Ingestion points:
SKILL.md(Phase 1) reads user-provided tool schemas, MCP server source code, and data from package registries likenpmorpip. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify the use of delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the ingested data.
- Capability inventory: The agent environment provides access to
bash,python3, and network operations. - Sanitization: The instructions lack requirements for validation or sanitization of the content before it is processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata