start-issue
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 26, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection through data ingested from external Linear issues.
- Ingestion points: The skill fetches issue details and branch names from the Linear API using the
get_issuetool (SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: The contextual summary presented to the user lacks explicit delimiters or instructions to prevent the agent from obeying directives embedded within the ticket's acceptance criteria or user stories.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the capability to execute shell commands (
git checkout) based on values fetched from the external source. - Sanitization: There is no evidence that the skill validates or sanitizes the fetched Linear data before it is processed or displayed.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs shell operations using unvalidated input from an external system.
- The
branchNameretrieved from Linear is directly interpolated intogit checkoutandgit checkout -bcommands. If a malicious actor crafts a branch name containing shell command separators (e.g.,; rm -rf /), it could lead to command injection if the agent environment does not properly escape the arguments.
Audit Metadata