minimum-viable-agentic
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- Indirect Prompt Injection (LOW): The suggested workflow involves an implementation agent reading and executing plans generated by a chore agent. This creates a potential surface for indirect prompt injection if the data used to generate plans is influenced by untrusted sources.\n
- Ingestion points: Generated plan files located in the
specs/directory as described in the implementation workflow.\n - Boundary markers: The provided templates for
.claude/commands/chore.mdandimplement.mdlack delimiters or specific instructions to isolate or ignore embedded malicious instructions.\n - Capability inventory: High; the skill description for the
agent.pymodule explicitly includes 'Claude Code subprocess execution', providing the capability to execute system commands.\n - Sanitization: Absent; there is no mention of validation, escaping, or filtering of the generated plan content before it is processed by the implementation agent.
Audit Metadata