gitops-apply
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 29, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The bootstrap documentation in
references/BOOTSTRAP-WORKFLOW.mdprovides commands to programmatically retrieve and decode the initial administrative password for ArgoCD from a Kubernetes secret. This exposes sensitive credentials in the agent's execution context. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The bootstrap scripts in
references/BOOTSTRAP-WORKFLOW.mddownload and apply Kubernetes manifests directly from the Argo Project GitHub repository. This involves the runtime execution of configuration from a remote source. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill involves the extensive use of powerful administrative CLI tools including
kubectl,git,argocd, andfluxto perform cluster mutations and repository management tasks. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection through the ingestion and processing of untrusted user input for manifest modifications.
- Ingestion points: User-provided requests for scaling, image updates, or configuration changes processed in
references/WORKFLOW-STEPS.md. - Boundary markers: Absent; there are no clear delimiters to separate user data from instructions.
- Capability inventory:
kubectl apply,git commit,argocd sync, andflux reconcilefound inSKILL.mdand referenced documentation. - Sanitization: Absent; the skill lacks automated validation or sanitization of user-provided values before they are applied to Kubernetes manifests.
Audit Metadata