prompt-generator

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026

Risk Level: CRITICALCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (CRITICAL): Shell Command Injection vulnerability in the 'Output and Save' step. The skill instructs the agent to execute echo "<generated_prompt>" | python scripts/save_prompt.py <project_root> <phase_number> <phase_name>. Since <generated_prompt>, <project_root>, and <phase_name> are constructed from user-provided input without sanitization, an attacker can inject shell metacharacters (e.g., ;, &, |, or backticks) to execute arbitrary commands.
  • Evidence (SKILL.md): echo "<generated_prompt>" | python scripts/save_prompt.py <project_root> <phase_number> <phase_name>
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION] (CRITICAL): The command injection vulnerability mentioned above directly facilitates Remote Code Execution (RCE), as the agent executes shell-level instructions on the host machine.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION] (HIGH): Category 8: Indirect Prompt Injection. The skill's core function is to generate instructions for downstream subagents.
  • Ingestion points: Processes user-provided variables like PHASE_NAME and PHASE_DOC_PATH and reads references/implementation-prompt-template.md.
  • Boundary markers: Absent. The template uses simple curly-brace interpolation ({PLACEHOLDER}), which does not prevent malicious instructions in the input from overriding the template's intent.
  • Capability inventory: Possesses file-writing capabilities and local script execution (scripts/save_prompt.py).
  • Sanitization: None. The skill blindly interpolates user input into a prompt that directs orchestration logic, allowing an attacker to hijack the behavior of subsequent agent sessions.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
CRITICAL
Analyzed
Feb 17, 2026, 12:22 AM