design-inspiration

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 17, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes a shell command via bun run to process design data into an external gallery backend.
  • Evidence: bun run ~/.agents/skills/laniameda-gallery-ingest/scripts/ingest.ts '<payload-json>' in SKILL.md.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on and executes a TypeScript script sourced from an external repository.
  • Evidence: Usage of ingest.ts located in a separately installed skill directory.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill recommends installing a dependency from a specific GitHub repository.
  • Evidence: bunx skills add https://github.com/laniamedaHQ/laniameda-gallery/tree/main/skills/laniameda-gallery-ingest in SKILL.md.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Transfers design metadata, URLs, and image paths to the laniameda.gallery service.
  • Evidence: The ingest workflow configured to send data to the CONVEX_URL backend.
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: Contains a hardcoded user identifier used for identifying the gallery owner.
  • Evidence: KB_OWNER_USER_ID=278674008 in SKILL.md.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection by processing untrusted files in the references directory.
  • Ingestion points: Reads all image and markdown files in /mnt/skills/user/design-inspiration/references/ (SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: Absent. There are no instructions for the agent to distinguish between design constraints and malicious instructions within these files.
  • Capability inventory: Shell command execution (bun run), file listing (ls), and file reading (view).
  • Sanitization: Absent. The agent is directed to "internalize" the content and apply it directly to code generation tasks.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Apr 17, 2026, 10:29 AM