skills/mindfold-ai/trellis/start/Gen Agent Trust Hub

start

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 26, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill frequently executes local Python scripts and shell commands to manage development tasks. Specifically, it calls python3 ./.trellis/scripts/get_context.py and python3 ./.trellis/scripts/task.py with various arguments. These scripts are project-local and represent the skill's primary functional logic.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents a potential command injection surface in Phase 1, Step 2, where user-supplied input such as <title> and <name> are interpolated into a shell command: TASK_DIR=$(python3 ./.trellis/scripts/task.py create "<title>" --slug <name>). If the agent does not properly escape these inputs, an attacker could provide a task name containing shell metacharacters to execute arbitrary commands.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection (Category 8). It explicitly instructs the agent to read and follow instructions from external files like .trellis/workflow.md and various files within .trellis/spec/. If these files are modified by an external contributor or attacker, they could contain malicious instructions that hijack the agent's behavior.
  • Ingestion points: .trellis/workflow.md, .trellis/spec/**/*, and user-provided task descriptions.
  • Boundary markers: None. The agent is told to "Follow the instructions in workflow.md" directly.
  • Capability inventory: File reading (cat), local script execution (python3), and implied file system modifications via task.py.
  • Sanitization: None. The skill assumes the contents of the .trellis directory are trusted.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Mar 26, 2026, 08:33 AM