gh-address-comments
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 9, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes the GitHub CLI (
gh) and a local Python scriptscripts/fetch_comments.py. It explicitly instructs the agent to request elevated system permissions usingsandbox_permissions=require_escalated.- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill requests high-privilege GitHub OAuth scopes, specificallyworkflowandrepo. Theworkflowscope grants administrative access to GitHub Actions, enabling the modification or deletion of CI/CD workflows, which is a significant privilege escalation risk.- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection attacks.- Ingestion points: Untrusted data from PR conversation comments and review threads are fetched via the GitHub API inscripts/fetch_comments.py.- Boundary markers: None. External content is provided to the agent without delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands.- Capability inventory: The agent is authorized to executeghcommands and is tasked with 'applying fixes,' which typically involves file system writes and code modification.- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, validation, or filtering of the fetched GitHub comment text before it is used to determine the agent's next actions.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata