beo-executing
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface where data from task descriptions and dependency reports are processed and used to generate instructions for implementing workers.
- Ingestion points: Task specifications are retrieved via
br show <TASK_ID> --jsonand previous task results are read usingbr comments list <DEP_ID> --jsonas described inreferences/execution-operations.mdandreferences/worker-prompt-guide.md. - Boundary markers: The
references/worker-prompt-guide.mduses a Markdown template with clear headers (e.g.,# Task,## Strategy Context) to provide structure and partial isolation for ingested content. - Capability inventory: The skill uses project-specific CLI tools for state management, interacts with a file reservation API, and utilizes a
dispatch_workermechanism to delegate tasks to other implementation-capable agents. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of explicit sanitization or escaping of the ingested task data before it is interpolated into worker prompts.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of local CLI tools
br(Bead Runner) andbv(Bead Viewer) to manage task lifecycle, update bead labels, and query dependencies within the local project environment, as documented in the operational playbooks.
Audit Metadata