t2000-repay

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 10, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires the installation and initialization of a CLI tool via npx @t2000/cli init. This downloads and executes code from the NPM registry. The @t2000 organization is not part of the trusted vendors list and does not match the known naming patterns for the skill author 'mission69b'.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill functions by executing shell commands (t2000 repay) on the host system.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill is vulnerable to command injection because user-provided inputs for the <amount> and [asset] parameters are directly interpolated into the shell command t2000 repay <amount> [asset]. An attacker could provide input containing shell metacharacters (e.g., ;, &&, or |) to execute arbitrary code.
  • Ingestion points: The <amount> and [asset] variables in SKILL.md are used as CLI arguments.
  • Boundary markers: No delimiters or safety warnings are used to isolate user input from the command string.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses the capability to execute the t2000 binary with arbitrary arguments via a shell subprocess.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of input validation, sanitization, or escaping of the user-provided data before it is passed to the shell.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Mar 10, 2026, 08:19 PM