fetching-library-docs
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (HIGH): The scripts
fetch-docs.shandfetch-raw.shinterpolate user-controlled variables like$LIBRARY_NAMEand$TOPICdirectly into shell command strings within double quotes. An attacker can inject shell commands using syntax like$(command)or backticks, which the shell evaluates before passing them to the underlying tools. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS] (HIGH): The skill relies on
npx -y @upstash/context7-mcpfor its core functionality. This pattern downloads and executes code from the npm registry at runtime from the@upstashorganization, which is not in the defined trust scope for this environment. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION] (HIGH): The combination of shell injection and runtime package execution provides a direct path for executing arbitrary code on the host system via crafted user queries.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION] (HIGH): The skill is designed to ingest and process documentation from external, untrusted sources. 1. Ingestion point:
fetch-docs.sh(line 125) viafetch-raw.sh. 2. Boundary markers: Absent. 3. Capability inventory: Subprocess execution, command execution, and network access. 4. Sanitization: None. External content is parsed only for structural elements (code blocks/notes) and passed directly to the LLM context, allowing for malicious instructions to be embedded in documentation. - [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION] (MEDIUM): Verification scripts and documentation suggest using
chmod +xon the provided shell scripts. While common for development, this facilitates the execution of scripts that are vulnerable to the aforementioned injection attacks.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata