dev-agent-spawn
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 14, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script dynamically generates and executes AppleScript via
osascriptto control the Ghostty terminal application, allowing the skill to programmatically open windows and send keyboard input. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill launches the Claude Code agent with the
--dangerously-skip-permissionsflag and thesandbox: {enabled: false}configuration, which bypasses the agent's built-in security controls and grants it full access to the user's shell. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an indirect prompt injection surface where untrusted data could influence the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: The
DIRECTORY,PROMPT, andSESSION_NAMEparameters inagent-spawn.sh. - Boundary markers: Absent; inputs are interpolated directly into the terminal commands.
- Capability inventory:
osascriptfor UI control,tmuxfor session management, andclaudewith unsandboxed shell and filesystem access. - Sanitization: Basic character escaping is performed for AppleScript strings, but no escaping is performed for the target shell environment, allowing command substitution (e.g., via backticks) in directory or prompt variables.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill documentation refers to and relies upon external Python scripts in
~/.agent-task-queue/which are not part of the analyzed skill package and represent unverified execution dependencies.
Audit Metadata