doc-claude-md

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 14, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection due to its core documentation generation logic.
  • Ingestion points: The scripts/init_docs.py script reads and extracts data from project-level files including package.json, pyproject.toml, Cargo.toml, go.mod, and README.md (specifically via detect_project_type and extract_readme_summary).
  • Boundary markers: The generated AGENTS.md file, which is intended to serve as a primary instruction source for AI agents, incorporates this extracted content into markdown sections but fails to use specific security delimiters or 'ignore instructions' warnings around this untrusted content.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses the capability to modify project documentation (CLAUDE.md, AGENTS.md) and execute system commands (tree). Instructions promoted into AGENTS.md could potentially influence future agent actions in the project context.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, validation, or escaping of the content extracted from external project files before it is written into the documentation.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes the system tree command to generate directory structure visualizations.
  • Evidence: Found in scripts/init_docs.py and scripts/validate_docs.py using subprocess.run calls to the tree binary.
  • Context: The execution is performed safely using a list of arguments and the default shell=False, which prevents command injection from the path arguments. The execution is limited to a specific utility for documentation purposes.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Mar 14, 2026, 09:35 PM