multi-tenant-safety-checker
Multi-tenant Safety Checker
Ensure complete tenant isolation and prevent data leakage.
Row Level Security (RLS)
PostgreSQL RLS Setup
-- Enable RLS on tables
ALTER TABLE users ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
ALTER TABLE orders ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
ALTER TABLE products ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
-- Create policy for users table
CREATE POLICY tenant_isolation_policy ON users
USING (tenant_id = current_setting('app.tenant_id')::INTEGER);
-- Create policy for orders table
CREATE POLICY tenant_isolation_policy ON orders
USING (tenant_id = current_setting('app.tenant_id')::INTEGER);
-- Create policy for products table
CREATE POLICY tenant_isolation_policy ON products
USING (tenant_id = current_setting('app.tenant_id')::INTEGER);
-- Force RLS even for table owners
ALTER TABLE users FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
ALTER TABLE orders FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
ALTER TABLE products FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
Application-Level Tenant Context
// middleware/tenant-context.ts
import { PrismaClient } from "@prisma/client";
export class TenantContext {
constructor(private prisma: PrismaClient) {}
async setTenant(tenantId: number): Promise<void> {
await this.prisma.$executeRaw`
SET LOCAL app.tenant_id = ${tenantId}
`;
}
async withTenant<T>(
tenantId: number,
callback: () => Promise<T>
): Promise<T> {
return this.prisma.$transaction(async (tx) => {
// Set tenant context for this transaction
await tx.$executeRaw`SET LOCAL app.tenant_id = ${tenantId}`;
// Execute queries within tenant context
return callback();
});
}
}
// Usage in API route
app.get("/api/orders", async (req, res) => {
const tenantId = req.user.tenantId;
const orders = await tenantContext.withTenant(tenantId, async () => {
return prisma.order.findMany(); // Automatically filtered by RLS
});
res.json(orders);
});
Tenant Isolation Checklist
# Multi-tenant Security Checklist
## Database Level
- [ ] All tables have `tenant_id` column
- [ ] `tenant_id` is NOT NULL on all tables
- [ ] Foreign keys include tenant_id checks
- [ ] Row Level Security enabled on all tables
- [ ] RLS policies created for all tables
- [ ] RLS enforced even for table owners
- [ ] Composite indexes include tenant_id
## Application Level
- [ ] Tenant context set on every request
- [ ] Tenant ID validated from JWT/session
- [ ] No raw SQL without tenant filter
- [ ] All queries include tenant_id (if no RLS)
- [ ] API endpoints validate tenant access
- [ ] File uploads scoped to tenant
- [ ] Background jobs include tenant context
## Testing
- [ ] Cross-tenant query tests
- [ ] RLS bypass attempt tests
- [ ] SQL injection with tenant bypass tests
- [ ] Automated regression tests
- [ ] Regular security audits
Automated Security Tests
// tests/tenant-isolation.test.ts
import { PrismaClient } from "@prisma/client";
describe("Tenant Isolation", () => {
let prisma: PrismaClient;
let tenant1Id: number;
let tenant2Id: number;
beforeAll(async () => {
prisma = new PrismaClient();
// Create test tenants
const tenant1 = await prisma.tenant.create({
data: { name: "Tenant 1" },
});
const tenant2 = await prisma.tenant.create({
data: { name: "Tenant 2" },
});
tenant1Id = tenant1.id;
tenant2Id = tenant2.id;
// Create test data
await prisma.user.create({
data: {
email: "user1@tenant1.com",
tenantId: tenant1Id,
},
});
await prisma.user.create({
data: {
email: "user2@tenant2.com",
tenantId: tenant2Id,
},
});
});
it("should not access data from other tenants", async () => {
// Set tenant context to Tenant 1
await prisma.$executeRaw`SET app.tenant_id = ${tenant1Id}`;
// Query users
const users = await prisma.user.findMany();
// Should only see Tenant 1 users
expect(users.length).toBe(1);
expect(users[0].email).toBe("user1@tenant1.com");
// Should NOT see Tenant 2 users
expect(users.find((u) => u.email === "user2@tenant2.com")).toBeUndefined();
});
it("should prevent cross-tenant updates", async () => {
await prisma.$executeRaw`SET app.tenant_id = ${tenant1Id}`;
// Try to update Tenant 2 user (should fail silently with RLS)
const tenant2User = await prisma.user.findFirst({
where: { email: "user2@tenant2.com" },
});
// Should not find user from other tenant
expect(tenant2User).toBeNull();
});
it("should prevent cross-tenant deletes", async () => {
await prisma.$executeRaw`SET app.tenant_id = ${tenant1Id}`;
// Try to delete Tenant 2 user
const result = await prisma.user.deleteMany({
where: { tenantId: tenant2Id },
});
// Should delete 0 rows (RLS prevents access)
expect(result.count).toBe(0);
// Verify user still exists
await prisma.$executeRaw`SET app.tenant_id = ${tenant2Id}`;
const user = await prisma.user.findFirst({
where: { email: "user2@tenant2.com" },
});
expect(user).not.toBeNull();
});
it("should handle transaction rollback correctly", async () => {
try {
await prisma.$transaction(async (tx) => {
await tx.$executeRaw`SET LOCAL app.tenant_id = ${tenant1Id}`;
// Create user
await tx.user.create({
data: {
email: "test@tenant1.com",
tenantId: tenant1Id,
},
});
// Force error
throw new Error("Rollback test");
});
} catch (error) {
// Transaction rolled back
}
// User should not exist
await prisma.$executeRaw`SET app.tenant_id = ${tenant1Id}`;
const user = await prisma.user.findFirst({
where: { email: "test@tenant1.com" },
});
expect(user).toBeNull();
});
});
RLS Audit Script
// scripts/audit-rls.ts
async function auditRLS() {
const tables = await prisma.$queryRaw<any[]>`
SELECT tablename
FROM pg_tables
WHERE schemaname = 'public'
AND tablename != '_prisma_migrations'
`;
console.log("🔍 Auditing Row Level Security...\n");
for (const { tablename } of tables) {
// Check if table has tenant_id
const columns = await prisma.$queryRaw<any[]>`
SELECT column_name
FROM information_schema.columns
WHERE table_name = ${tablename}
AND column_name = 'tenant_id'
`;
if (columns.length === 0) {
console.log(`❌ ${tablename}: Missing tenant_id column`);
continue;
}
// Check if RLS is enabled
const rlsStatus = await prisma.$queryRaw<any[]>`
SELECT relname, relrowsecurity, relforcerowsecurity
FROM pg_class
WHERE relname = ${tablename}
`;
if (!rlsStatus[0]?.relrowsecurity) {
console.log(`❌ ${tablename}: RLS not enabled`);
continue;
}
if (!rlsStatus[0]?.relforcerowsecurity) {
console.log(`⚠️ ${tablename}: RLS not forced (owners can bypass)`);
}
// Check if policy exists
const policies = await prisma.$queryRaw<any[]>`
SELECT policyname, qual
FROM pg_policies
WHERE tablename = ${tablename}
`;
if (policies.length === 0) {
console.log(`❌ ${tablename}: No RLS policies defined`);
} else {
console.log(
`✅ ${tablename}: RLS configured (${policies.length} policies)`
);
}
}
}
Composite Indexes for Performance
-- Composite indexes with tenant_id first
CREATE INDEX idx_orders_tenant_user ON orders(tenant_id, user_id);
CREATE INDEX idx_orders_tenant_created ON orders(tenant_id, created_at DESC);
CREATE INDEX idx_products_tenant_category ON products(tenant_id, category);
-- This ensures queries filtered by tenant_id are fast
-- SELECT * FROM orders WHERE tenant_id = 1 AND user_id = 123; -- Uses index
Middleware for Automatic Tenant Injection
// prisma/middleware.ts
import { Prisma } from "@prisma/client";
export function tenantMiddleware(tenantId: number) {
return async (
params: Prisma.MiddlewareParams,
next: (params: Prisma.MiddlewareParams) => Promise<any>
) => {
// Inject tenant_id into all queries
if (params.action === "findMany" || params.action === "findFirst") {
params.args.where = {
...params.args.where,
tenantId,
};
}
if (params.action === "create") {
params.args.data = {
...params.args.data,
tenantId,
};
}
if (params.action === "createMany") {
if (Array.isArray(params.args.data)) {
params.args.data = params.args.data.map((item) => ({
...item,
tenantId,
}));
}
}
return next(params);
};
}
// Usage:
const prisma = new PrismaClient();
prisma.$use(tenantMiddleware(req.user.tenantId));
Security Regression Tests
// tests/security-regression.test.ts
describe("Security Regression Tests", () => {
it("should not allow SQL injection to bypass tenant", async () => {
const maliciousInput = "1 OR 1=1 --";
// This should be safely parameterized
const users = await prisma.user.findMany({
where: {
tenantId: parseInt(maliciousInput), // Will be NaN, safe
},
});
expect(users).toEqual([]);
});
it("should not expose tenant data via API error messages", async () => {
try {
await prisma.user.findUniqueOrThrow({
where: { id: 9999 }, // Non-existent
});
} catch (error) {
// Error should not leak tenant information
expect(error.message).not.toContain("tenant_id");
expect(error.message).not.toContain("tenantId");
}
});
});
Best Practices
- Always use RLS: Don't rely on application logic alone
- Force RLS: Even for table owners (FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY)
- Test thoroughly: Automated tests for cross-tenant access
- Audit regularly: Monthly RLS configuration audits
- Composite indexes: tenant_id first in all indexes
- Tenant validation: Verify user belongs to tenant
- Monitor: Log cross-tenant access attempts
Output Checklist
- RLS enabled on all tables
- RLS policies created
- Tenant context middleware
- Automated security tests
- RLS audit script
- Composite indexes created
- Cross-tenant access prevention tested
- Security regression test suite
More from monkey1sai/openai-cli
modal-drawer-system
Implements accessible modals and drawers with focus trap, ESC to close, scroll lock, portal rendering, and ARIA attributes. Includes sample implementations for common use cases like edit forms, confirmations, and detail views. Use when building "modals", "dialogs", "drawers", "sidebars", or "overlays".
10eslint-prettier-config
Configures ESLint and Prettier for consistent code quality with TypeScript, React, and modern best practices. Use when users request "ESLint setup", "Prettier config", "linting configuration", "code formatting", or "lint rules".
9api-security-hardener
Hardens API security with rate limiting, input validation, authentication, and protection against common attacks. Use when users request "API security", "secure API", "rate limiting", "input validation", or "API protection".
9secure-headers-csp-builder
Implements security headers and Content Security Policy with safe rollout strategy (report-only → enforce), testing, and compatibility checks. Use for "security headers", "CSP", "HTTP headers", or "XSS protection".
9security-incident-playbook-generator
Creates response procedures for security incidents with containment steps, communication templates, and evidence collection. Use for "incident response", "security playbook", "breach response", or "IR plan".
9bruno-collection-generator
Generates Bruno collection files (.bru) from Express, Next.js, Fastify, or other API routes. Creates organized collections with environments, authentication, and folder structure for the open-source Bruno API client. Use when users request "generate bruno collection", "bruno api testing", "create bru files", or "bruno import".
9