slides-build

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 20, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it processes untrusted user-provided briefs and external project artifacts to generate the final slide deck structure.
  • Ingestion points: User-provided topic briefs and intent (Step 1) and external JSON artifacts like resolved_manifest.json (Step 2).
  • Boundary markers: The instructions do not define clear delimiters or use safety instructions to isolate ingested content from the slide-generation logic.
  • Capability inventory: The skill executes the agent-slides tool via uvx, reads multiple local project files, and writes JSON and PPTX files to the project directory.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization, validation, or escaping of the ingested data is described before the content is interpolated into slide operations.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads and executes an external package at runtime using the uv package manager.
  • Evidence: The process relies on uvx --from agent-slides to access slide rendering and QA functionality. This tool is recognized as a vendor-specific resource for the author 'mpuig'.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes multiple shell commands to perform preflight checks, rendering, and quality assurance.
  • Evidence: Calls to slides preflight, slides render, and slides qa are issued via uvx throughout the project lifecycle.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Mar 20, 2026, 04:17 AM