analyzing-linux-system-artifacts
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 15, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The Python script
scripts/agent.pyis vulnerable to command injection. Therun_cmdfunction utilizessubprocess.run(shell=True), and thefind_suid_binariesfunction directly interpolates theevidence_rootvariable into a shell string via an f-string. Sinceevidence_rootis derived from an external command-line argument (sys.argv[1]), a malicious actor could provide a path containing shell metacharacters (e.g.,; rm -rf /) to execute arbitrary commands on the system. - [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The skill is configured to systematically collect and read extremely sensitive Linux system files. This includes
/etc/shadow(password hashes),/etc/sudoers(privilege configurations), and private SSHauthorized_keys. While relevant to forensics, this behavior constitutes a high risk of data exposure if the agent is manipulated into targeting a live system rather than an isolated forensic image. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits a significant surface for indirect prompt injection because it processes untrusted data from a potentially compromised system's logs and history files without sanitization or boundary markers.
- Ingestion points: Files like
.bash_history,/etc/crontab, and systemd service files are read into the agent's context for analysis. - Boundary markers: There are no delimiters or specific instructions to the agent to disregard malicious commands embedded within the artifact data.
- Capability inventory: The agent possesses the capability to execute shell commands through the logic in
scripts/agent.pyand the workflows inSKILL.md. - Sanitization: The script performs no escaping or validation of the text content retrieved from forensic artifacts before processing it.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata