exploiting-jwt-algorithm-confusion-attack

Fail

Audited by Snyk on Mar 15, 2026

Risk Level: CRITICAL
Full Analysis

HIGH W007: Insecure credential handling detected in skill instructions.

  • Insecure credential handling detected (high risk: 1.00). The prompt instructs the agent to capture a valid JWT (a sensitive bearer token) and then construct and send forged tokens by including those JWT values verbatim in Authorization headers and prints/inspects token/header data, which requires handling and outputting secret token values.

CRITICAL E006: Malicious code pattern detected in skill scripts.

  • Malicious code pattern detected (high risk: 1.00). The content explicitly instructs and provides code to forge JWTs, bypass signature verification (alg:none and algorithm confusion), perform JKU/KID header injection, and escalate privileges—behavior intended to enable unauthorized access and account takeover if used without authorization.

MEDIUM W011: Third-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk).

  • Third-party content exposure detected (high risk: 1.00). The skill's workflow and code explicitly fetch and parse untrusted public endpoints (e.g., SKILL.md Step 2 uses requests.get on /.well-known/jwks.json and the OpenID configuration, and Step 5 discusses JKU/JWKS URLs) and scripts/agent.py reads/uses those JWKS/JKU/X5U values to construct and sign tokens, so third-party content is ingested and can materially influence the agent's actions.

Issues (3)

W007
HIGH

Insecure credential handling detected in skill instructions.

E006
CRITICAL

Malicious code pattern detected in skill scripts.

W011
MEDIUM

Third-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk).

Audit Metadata
Risk Level
CRITICAL
Analyzed
Mar 15, 2026, 10:50 PM
Issues
3