implementing-image-provenance-verification-with-cosign

Fail

Audited by Snyk on Apr 20, 2026

Risk Level: HIGH
Full Analysis

HIGH W007: Insecure credential handling detected in skill instructions.

  • Insecure credential handling detected (high risk: 0.80). The prompt includes an example that injects an OIDC identity token directly into a CLI argument (--identity-token=$(cat /var/run/sigstore/cosign/oidc-token)), which is an instruction to include a secret value in a command and matches the insecure pattern of passing secrets as command-line arguments.

MEDIUM W011: Third-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk).

  • Third-party content exposure detected (high risk: 0.80). The skill's scripts (scripts/agent.py and scripts/process.py) and SKILL.md explicitly run cosign verify / verify-attestation and Rekor/Fulcio/registry commands that fetch and parse signatures/attestations from public container registries and the Rekor transparency log (untrusted, user-supplied content), and those parsed results are used to make audit decisions and generate policies/workflows.

MEDIUM W013: Attempt to modify system services in skill instructions.

  • Attempt to modify system services in skill instructions detected (medium risk: 0.60). The prompt includes explicit sudo installation steps (sudo mv/chmod) and cluster/helm installations that require elevated privileges and modify system or cluster state, so it encourages actions that could change the machine's state.

Issues (3)

W007
HIGH

Insecure credential handling detected in skill instructions.

W011
MEDIUM

Third-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk).

W013
MEDIUM

Attempt to modify system services in skill instructions.

Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Apr 20, 2026, 11:33 PM
Issues
3