performing-initial-access-with-evilginx3

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 21, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The SKILL.md file contains instructions to download and build the EvilGinx3 framework from a third-party GitHub repository (https://github.com/kgretzky/evilginx2.git). While well-known in the security community, this repository is not managed by a trusted organization or well-known service provider.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The workflow instructions in SKILL.md require the user to execute the compiled binary using sudo ./bin/evilginx, granting the third-party code root privileges on the system. Additionally, the script scripts/agent.py uses subprocess.run to execute the evilginx command to check its version.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to Indirect Prompt Injection (Category 8) because it processes untrusted data from phishlet configuration files and session logs which could contain malicious instructions.
  • Ingestion points: scripts/agent.py reads external YAML phishlets and session log files in parse_phishlet, analyze_session_log, and generate_detection_rules. scripts/process.py reads session capture files.
  • Boundary markers: None. The scripts read and process file content directly without using delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded agent commands.
  • Capability inventory: scripts/agent.py has the ability to execute shell commands via subprocess.run. scripts/process.py performs file system write operations when exporting cookies.
  • Sanitization: While scripts/agent.py uses yaml.safe_load, the log parsing logic in both scripts uses simple string searching and regular expressions without validating the integrity or source of the input data.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Apr 21, 2026, 12:22 AM