skills/mukul975/anthropic-cybersecurity-skills/performing-initial-access-with-evilginx3/Gen Agent Trust Hub
performing-initial-access-with-evilginx3
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 21, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The
SKILL.mdfile contains instructions to download and build the EvilGinx3 framework from a third-party GitHub repository (https://github.com/kgretzky/evilginx2.git). While well-known in the security community, this repository is not managed by a trusted organization or well-known service provider. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The workflow instructions in
SKILL.mdrequire the user to execute the compiled binary usingsudo ./bin/evilginx, granting the third-party code root privileges on the system. Additionally, the scriptscripts/agent.pyusessubprocess.runto execute theevilginxcommand to check its version. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to Indirect Prompt Injection (Category 8) because it processes untrusted data from phishlet configuration files and session logs which could contain malicious instructions.
- Ingestion points:
scripts/agent.pyreads external YAML phishlets and session log files inparse_phishlet,analyze_session_log, andgenerate_detection_rules.scripts/process.pyreads session capture files. - Boundary markers: None. The scripts read and process file content directly without using delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded agent commands.
- Capability inventory:
scripts/agent.pyhas the ability to execute shell commands viasubprocess.run.scripts/process.pyperforms file system write operations when exporting cookies. - Sanitization: While
scripts/agent.pyusesyaml.safe_load, the log parsing logic in both scripts uses simple string searching and regular expressions without validating the integrity or source of the input data.
Audit Metadata