skills/mukul975/anthropic-cybersecurity-skills/testing-api-for-broken-object-level-authorization/Gen Agent Trust Hub
testing-api-for-broken-object-level-authorization
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 15, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Automated analysis and manual inspection identified a high-risk command pattern that pipes remote content from an external URL directly into the Python interpreter.
- Evidence:
curl -s https://target-api.example.com/api/docs/swagger.json | python3inSKILL.mdas flagged by the automated security alerts. While the documentation also shows the use of the-m json.toolflag, the base pattern of piping unvalidated remote content to an interpreter is a dangerous practice that can lead to arbitrary code execution. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions and a specialized script to execute various system commands and network operations.
- Evidence: Extensive use of
curl,python3, and the web fuzzerffufwithin theSKILL.mdworkflow for reconnaissance and data retrieval. - Evidence: The
scripts/agent.pyfile uses therequestslibrary to perform automated network requests to user-defined API endpoints. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches documentation and data from remote servers to drive its security testing logic.
- Evidence: Workflow steps in
SKILL.mdinvolve downloading OpenAPI/Swagger specifications fromtarget-api.example.com. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The methodology for testing authorization vulnerabilities involves the manual capture and handling of sensitive authentication secrets.
- Evidence: Code examples in
SKILL.mddemonstrate storing JSON Web Tokens (JWTs) and session cookies in plain text string variables. - Evidence: The testing workflow requires the management of multiple distinct tokens for different test users, increasing the risk of exposure.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a surface for indirect prompt injection because it ingests and processes data from external, potentially untrusted API endpoints.
- Ingestion points: Data is ingested into the agent's context through API response parsing in
scripts/agent.pyand JSON parsing inSKILL.mdshell commands. - Boundary markers: The skill does not implement boundary markers or instructions to ignore potential commands embedded in the fetched JSON data.
- Capability inventory: The
scripts/agent.pycomponent has the capability to perform network requests (requests) and write files to the disk (json.dump). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or strict schema validation for the external API payloads before they are consumed and acted upon by the agent.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://target-api.example.com/api/docs/swagger.json - DO NOT USE without thorough review
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata