feishu-messaging
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFE
Full Analysis
- Indirect Prompt Injection (HIGH): The skill possesses a high-risk attack surface because it is designed to ingest untrusted data from an external source (reading Feishu messages via
im:message) and has the capability to execute side-effect-heavy actions (sending messages, creating documents, and managing wikis). - Ingestion points: Feishu messages retrieved through API.
- Boundary markers: None. There is no evidence of delimiters or instructions to the agent to ignore embedded commands in the processed messages.
- Capability inventory:
im_v1_message_create(write),docx:document(write/modify),bitable:app(write/modify),wiki:wiki(write/modify). - Sanitization: None. The skill lacks validation or filtering for content retrieved from external messages.
- Data Exposure (MEDIUM): The skill contains hardcoded Personally Identifiable Information (PII) and internal identifiers in the
已知用户 ID 记录table, including a full name, a specificopen_id(ou_18b8063b232cbdec73ea1541dfb74890), and an internal company email address. - Unsafe Application Solicitation (HIGH): The skill includes direct links and instructions to grant extensive permissions (contacts, messages, documents, knowledge base) to a specific, hardcoded Feishu App ID (
cli_a8831f109ffc500e). This pattern is characteristic of social engineering where a user is tricked into granting an attacker-controlled application full access to their corporate workspace.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata