printing-press
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 9, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the user to install the
printing-pressbinary from the author's GitHub repository (github.com/mvanhorn/cli-printing-press/v4) usinggo install. It also facilitates the installation of third-party tools such asbrowser-use(viapiporuv) andagent-browser(vianpmorbrew) to support its browser-based API discovery functionality. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The 'Codex Mode' allows the skill to delegate code-writing and bug-fixing tasks to the
codexCLI. This involves generating source code based on descriptions and logic extracted from untrusted web sources (e.g., API specifications, community tool documentation), which could lead to the generation of malicious code if those external sources are poisoned. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of the
Bashtool to perform technical tasks, including building Go binaries, running network reachability probes withcurl, and executing browser automation scripts. It also usesswift -efor accessing macOS-specific frameworks. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The
browser-snifffeature records network traffic to discover hidden API endpoints, a process that inherently handles sensitive data such as session cookies and authentication headers. Although the skill includes dedicated logic inreferences/secret-protection.mdto redact these secrets before archiving, the initial capture of this data is a potential risk factor. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from
WebSearch,WebFetch, and live browser captures to create an 'absorb manifest'. This manifest is then used to guide theAgenttool andcodexCLI in generating the CLI's features, making the generation process susceptible to indirect prompt injection from malicious content hosted on the web.
Audit Metadata