codex-cli

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 29, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill is centered around executing the codex CLI tool. It specifically encourages the use of the --full-auto flag, which bypasses step-by-step approval, and mentions the -s danger-full-access sandbox mode. This combination allows an external process to perform potentially destructive operations on the host system without user oversight.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The codex cloud exec command enables the submission of local code tasks to a remote cloud service for processing. This represents a data exfiltration vector where sensitive project information or source code could be transmitted to infrastructure not explicitly trusted in the provided context.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection (Category 8).
  • Ingestion points: The agent is instructed to read output from the external Codex tool using commands like cat /tmp/codex-out.md or by parsing JSON streams.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions do not define boundary markers or 'ignore' instructions for the data ingested from the external tool.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has access to subprocess execution via the codex exec command, which can modify the file system and run shell tasks.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation of the content returned by the external AI before the agent processes or acts upon it.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides patterns for piping complex user-provided prompts directly into shell commands (e.g., cat <<'PROMPT' | codex exec -), which could lead to command injection if input is not properly handled by the underlying shell environment.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Mar 29, 2026, 08:53 AM