embedded-dev-antigravity
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 27, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill explicitly instructs the agent to ask users for their Wi-Fi SSID and password in Step 6 to facilitate device connectivity. This involves handling sensitive credentials in plaintext within the LLM's context and passing them to terminal commands.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the
shelltool to invoke thefastmcpCLI. This tool acts as a bridge to a local MCP server (http://127.0.0.1:30837/mcp), allowing the agent to execute arbitrary commands on the host machine and connected hardware (e.g.,idf.py flash,nmcli,openocd). - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation encourages users to download the Electerm binary from an external website (
https://electerm.html5beta.com/) and install thefastmcpPython package. While these are established tools, they represent a requirement for third-party software installation. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to Indirect Prompt Injection (Category 8) because it mandates the use of
web_searchto ingest technical documentation from external sites (GitHub, official docs) without sanitization or boundary markers, while possessing high-privilegeshellcapabilities. - Ingestion points: Step 3 and Step 4 use
web_searchto fetch external content. - Boundary markers: None implemented for search results.
- Capability inventory: Full
shellaccess and hardware control viafastmcp. - Sanitization: No filtering or escaping is performed on data retrieved from the web.
Audit Metadata