self-reflection
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 15, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [Indirect Prompt Injection] (HIGH): The skill processes logs from group chats which contain data from untrusted external sources.
- Ingestion Point: File
SKILL.md(Step 1) executes bash commands to read the last 50 lines of chat logs from~/.config/alma/groups/*.log. - Boundary Markers: Absent. Logs are read and presented to the LLM without delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands.
- Capability Inventory: The agent has the capability to modify its persistent identity via
alma soul append-traitand its long-term memory viaalma memory add. - Sanitization: None. The agent is explicitly told to 'extract lessons' and 'update personality' based on the retrieved logs, creating a direct path for an attacker to inject permanent behavioral traits.
- [Command Execution] (LOW): The skill uses the
Bashtool to perform file system operations (mkdir, cat, tail) and execute thealmaCLI. While these are required for the skill's functionality, they provide a broad attack surface if the agent is compromised via the aforementioned prompt injection.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata