netease-music-assistant
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 23, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses shell commands to interact with the system's cron table (
crontab). It provides instructions to programmatically append new tasks to the user's cron configuration, which establishes persistence on the host machine. - Evidence: The skill body contains the command sequence
(crontab -l 2>/dev/null; echo "分 时 * * * /usr/local/bin/node /path/to/main.js 场景") | crontab -. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on and executes external CLI tools and scripts from the local file system.
- Evidence: References to the use of
ncm-cliand execution of scripts via/usr/local/bin/node /path/to/main.js. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses local files containing sensitive user data, such as listening preferences and history, and provides a mechanism to transmit this data to external IM platforms (e.g., Feishu/Lark) using the OpenClaw tool.
- Evidence: Accessing files in
~/.config/ncm/and pushing recommendations to IM channels. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a surface for indirect prompt injection because it processes untrusted metadata from an external music API and possesses high-privilege capabilities.
- Ingestion points: Data retrieved via
ncm-cliincludingsongTag,artists, and songnamefields inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: Absent; there are no clear delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands in the processed music metadata.
- Capability inventory: Modification of system cron jobs, local file system access/writes, and outbound network communication via IM integration tools.
- Sanitization: While user input is validated for content safety, external metadata ingested from the music service is not sanitized or escaped before being used in prompts or logic.
Audit Metadata