skills/neversight/skills_feed/codex/Gen Agent Trust Hub

codex

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 20, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION] (HIGH): User-provided task descriptions are directly interpolated into the instructions for the autonomous subagent. An attacker could craft a task that overrides the subagent's constraints to perform malicious actions like deleting files, exfiltrating data, or establishing persistence.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (HIGH): The skill executes the codex CLI with --full-auto by default, granting it the ability to modify the workspace autonomously. This bypasses typical human-in-the-loop safety checks for AI-driven modifications.
  • [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION] (HIGH): The skill explicitly includes a danger-full-access sandbox mode. While the skill claims this should be used with caution, its presence provides a direct path for the agent to acquire full system permissions.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION] (LOW): The skill gathers context from the environment (git status, diffs, logs). If the repository contains malicious content in file names, commit messages, or code, it could influence the subagent's behavior.
  • Ingestion points: git status, git diff, git log output.
  • Boundary markers: The prompt uses <context>, <task>, <constraints>, and <output> tags, which help but do not eliminate the risk of adversarial input.
  • Capability inventory: The subagent has Bash, Read, Grep, and Glob tools, and can modify files.
  • Sanitization: No explicit sanitization of the gathered git context or user input is performed before interpolation into the prompt.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 20, 2026, 05:34 PM