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Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 19, 2026
Risk Level: CRITICALREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION] (CRITICAL): The skill implements a piped remote execution pattern where a script is downloaded via curl and immediately executed by the shell.\n
- Evidence:
curl -fsSL https://cli.inference.sh | shfound inSKILL.md. The sourceinference.shis not a trusted repository, allowing for arbitrary, unvetted code execution on the host machine.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS] (MEDIUM): The skill attempts to install additional unverified dependencies at runtime.\n - Evidence:
npx skills add inferencesh/skills@...commands inSKILL.mdpull external code from a third-party source not listed in the trusted organizations list.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (MEDIUM): The skill requests broad shell tool permissions.\n - Evidence: The
allowed-toolssection inSKILL.mdspecifiesBash(infsh *), which grants the agent the ability to execute any subcommand under theinfshCLI, increasing the potential impact of a prompt injection attack.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION] (LOW): The skill exhibits an attack surface for indirect prompt injection.\n - Ingestion points: Untrusted HTML and text data are processed by the
infsh app runcommand inSKILL.md.\n - Boundary markers: Absent; there are no clear delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands in the processed data.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes the
Bash(infsh *)tool to interact with remote APIs and local systems.\n - Sanitization: None detected; user-provided text or HTML is directly interpolated into the command-line arguments.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://cli.inference.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata