audio-jingle
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 6, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill defines an execution pattern in
SKILL.md(Step 3) where shell commands are constructed by interpolating values from project metadata and user prompts. Specifically, the--model,--voice, and--promptarguments are directly mapped to external inputs without escaping instructions, which could allow shell metacharacters to alter command behavior. - Evidence:
node "$OD_BIN" media generate ... --model "<audioModel from metadata>" ... --prompt "<assembled prompt from Step 2>"inSKILL.md. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection (Category 8) because it processes untrusted project metadata and user-supplied scripts and uses them in a powerful subprocess execution without sanitization.
- Ingestion points: Project metadata fields such as
audioModel,voice, and user-provided script content used in thepromptargument are read into the agent context. - Boundary markers: There are no boundary markers or explicit instructions for the agent to ignore or escape embedded commands within the prompt data.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the capability to execute shell commands via a subprocess call (
node "$OD_BIN"). - Sanitization: The instructions do not include any steps for the agent to validate, escape, or sanitize the content before it is passed to the command-line interface.
Audit Metadata