diffity-review
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions direct the agent to execute shell commands using the user-supplied
refargument (e.g.,diffity <ref> --no-open --new). Without explicit validation, this allows for command injection if a crafted ref string is provided. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill includes instructions to install the
diffityCLI tool globally usingnpm install -g diffityif it is not already present on the system. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and act upon instructions found in
CLAUDE.mdfiles within the target repository. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where a malicious actor could influence the agent's review logic or behavior by placing instructions in these files. - Ingestion points:
CLAUDE.mdfiles in the repository root and subdirectories. - Boundary markers: None specified; the agent is instructed to read these files and follow the rules within.
- Capability inventory: Execution of
diffityandgitcommands, file reading, and potential network access via browser opening. - Sanitization: No sanitization or filtering of the content from
CLAUDE.mdis performed.
Audit Metadata