competitor-intel
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 21, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted content from the live web retrieved via
nimble searchandnimble extract. - Ingestion points: Web search results and extracted page content are ingested into the agent context in
SKILL.md(Steps 3, 4, 5, and 6). - Boundary markers: The skill uses
--format markdownfor extraction but lacks explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore potential commands embedded in the retrieved web content. - Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant capabilities including
Bash(subprocess execution),Write(local file persistence in~/.nimble/), and network access via the vendor CLI. - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or filtering of web-retrieved content is described before it is analyzed by the agent.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill constructs shell commands using user-supplied arguments (e.g., domain names, company names) in
SKILL.md(Step 1 and Step 4). This pattern relies on the agent to correctly sanitize inputs when generating the finalBashtool calls. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: During onboarding in
references/profile-and-onboarding.md, the skill instructs the user to install the vendor's command-line tool (@nimbleway/cli) usingnpm install -g. This is a legitimate requirement for the skill's functionality as provided by the author. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill requires a
NIMBLE_API_KEYand, inreferences/profile-and-onboarding.md, suggests that users add anexportcommand to their~/.zshrcor~/.bashrcto persist it. This is a standard but noteworthy practice for CLI tool configuration.
Audit Metadata