skills/ninehills/skills/send-file/Gen Agent Trust Hub

send-file

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 28, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill provides a direct path for extracting data from the local filesystem to a remote Telegram chat via the alma CLI tool.
  • Evidence: The skill's instructions tell the agent it must deliver "ANY file the user asks to see" and mentions "sharing any file path".
  • Evidence: The bash commands alma send file, alma send photo, etc., transmit the file contents to the destination specified by the ALMA_CHAT_ID environment variable.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill is configured to use the Bash tool to execute system commands.
  • Evidence: The allowed-tools section explicitly includes Bash, and the core functionality relies on executing the alma command-line interface.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill has a high vulnerability to data exposure via user manipulation (Indirect Prompt Injection surface).
  • Ingestion points: File paths are ingested directly from user prompts or generated by the agent based on user requests (e.g., SKILL.md mentions triggers like "sharing any file path").
  • Boundary markers: None. There are no instructions or system constraints provided within the skill to prevent the agent from accessing sensitive locations like ~/.ssh/, .env files, or /etc/.
  • Capability inventory: The skill combines filesystem read access with network transmission capabilities via the alma tool.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of path validation or sanitization logic to ensure that only intended or safe files are transmitted.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Feb 28, 2026, 09:32 AM