skill-installer
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFE
Full Analysis
- EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS (HIGH): The skill is designed to fetch and install new functional modules (skills) from external sources. According to
SKILL.md, it can install from any GitHub repository provided by the user, including private ones. - Evidence:
scripts/install-skill-from-github.py --repo <owner>/<repo> --path <path/to/skill>(referenced inSKILL.md). - REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION (HIGH): The primary purpose of this skill is to place new executable code into the
$CODEX_HOME/skillsdirectory. This is a direct mechanism for Remote Code Execution (RCE) once the agent environment is restarted or the new skills are loaded. - Evidence:
SKILL.mdinstructions: "After installing a skill, tell the user: 'Restart Codex to pick up new skills.'" - CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE (MEDIUM): The utility
scripts/github_utils.pyautomatically retrievesGITHUB_TOKENorGH_TOKENfrom the environment and includes it in theAuthorizationheader for network requests. - Evidence:
github_utils.pylines 13-16:token = os.environ.get("GITHUB_TOKEN") or os.environ.get("GH_TOKEN"); if token: headers["Authorization"] = f"token {token}". - Risk: If a user provides a malicious repository URL, the script may transmit the user's secret GitHub token to an attacker-controlled endpoint.
- COMMAND_EXECUTION (LOW): The skill requires elevated permissions within the sandbox to perform network requests and write to the file system.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdstates: "All of these scripts use network, so when running in the sandbox, request escalation when running them."
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata