hwp
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 27, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads software from external sources not belonging to the author or known trusted providers. Evidence:
npm install -g @ohah/hwpjsandgit clone https://github.com/jkf87/hwp-mcp.gitinstructions in SKILL.md. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill executes installation commands for unvetted third-party software which can lead to code execution at install time. Evidence:
pip install -r requirements.txtis executed after cloning thehwp-mcprepository, allowing for arbitrary code execution through malicious requirements or setup scripts. Evidence:npm install -g @ohah/hwpjsinstalls a global package from an unvetted npm scope. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses shell commands to interact with the system environment. Evidence:
node -p "process.platform"to detect the OS. Evidence: Direct execution ofhwpjsand Python scripts (hwp_mcp_stdio_server.py). - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits a surface for indirect prompt injection by processing external documents (Category 8). 1. Ingestion points:
.hwpfiles (SKILL.md). 2. Boundary markers: Absent. 3. Capability inventory: Shell command execution, package installation, and file system writes (SKILL.md). 4. Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the document content is mentioned before processing.
Audit Metadata