tao-launch-workflow

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 2, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to generate and execute shell scripts, sbatch snippets for SLURM, and other platform-specific commands. It relies on a suite of helper Python scripts (e.g., list_tao_platforms.py, resolve_tao_image.py, check_tao_launch_preflight.py) located in the directory defined by the environment variable TAO_SKILL_BANK_PATH.- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The workflow involves requesting and managing sensitive credentials such as SSH_KEY_PATH, HF_TOKEN, and cloud provider access keys. The instructions specifically guide the agent to source these from local environment files (e.g., /.tao/secrets.env) while strictly prohibiting the output or logging of secret values.- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses sensitive local file paths, including SSH keys (/.ssh/id_ed25519) and configuration files, to verify platform connectivity and satisfy credential requirements during the launch preflight stage. This is a legitimate requirement for cluster access in the context of the skill's purpose.- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The instructions include a dependency remediation step that prompts the user to install necessary external packages and CLI tools, such as nvidia-tao-sdk variants, aws-cli, or Docker clients, when they are detected as missing from the environment.- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests and processes external data from datasets (annotations and media) in formats like JSON or JSONL. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection if the content of these files is malicious, although the skill includes preflight checks to validate schema and content before execution.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 2, 2026, 03:30 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — tao-launch-workflow