orchestrating-skills
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 7, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXPOSURE_AND_EXFILTRATION]: The skill attempts to retrieve an API key from a hardcoded sensitive file path at
/mnt/project/claude.envif the environment variable is not present. While used for official API communication, accessing sensitive environment files from predictable paths is a security risk. - Evidence: The
_get_api_keyfunction inscripts/client.pyreads from/mnt/project/claude.env. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The orchestration logic dynamically modifies the Python module search path (
sys.path) to import and execute code from separate filesystem locations, such as other user-uploaded skills. This allows for execution of code that is not contained within the skill's own package. - Evidence: In
scripts/orchestrate.py, the_persistfunction usessys.path.insert(0, search_path)to load scripts from/mnt/skills/user/rememberingor/home/user/claude-skills/remembering. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process arbitrary text context which is then interpolated into several prompt templates for sub-tasks and synthesis. This architecture is vulnerable to instructions embedded in the analyzed data.
- Ingestion points: The
contextargument passed to theorchestratefunction inscripts/orchestrate.py. - Boundary markers: Uses basic Markdown headers (e.g.,
## Context) to separate user context from system instructions. - Capability inventory: The skill has network access via
httpxand the ability to load and execute external scripts via filesystem path modification. - Sanitization: No evidence of input validation, filtering, or escaping for the ingested context data was found.
Audit Metadata