tiling-tree
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 7, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Indirect prompt injection surface exists where untrusted data (user-provided problem and subagent-generated branch definitions) is interpolated into subsequent LLM prompts.
- Ingestion points:
tiling_tree.pyaccepts theproblemstring from command-line arguments andbranchesdata from JSON responses generated by external subagents. - Boundary markers: Absent. Data is interpolated directly into prompts (e.g.,
_evaluator_prompt) without specific delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands. - Capability inventory: The skill uses
invoke_claudeandinvoke_parallelfor multi-agent orchestration and performs filesystem writes to/mnt/user-data/outputs/. - Sanitization: Absent. Content from subagent responses is parsed as JSON but the resulting strings are not sanitized for malicious instructions before being used in subsequent splitting or evaluation prompts.
Audit Metadata