tiling-tree
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The script
scripts/tiling_tree.pyinterpolates the user-suppliedproblemandcriteriavariables directly into the prompts used to instruct the LLM sub-agents. Because these inputs are not sanitized or wrapped in boundary markers, a malicious user could provide a problem statement containing instructions that override the agent's behavior. - Ingestion points: The
problemandcriteriaarguments are ingested via command-line parameters inscripts/tiling_tree.py. - Boundary markers: No delimiters (like XML tags) or 'ignore embedded instructions' warnings are present in the prompt templates
_splitter_promptor_evaluator_prompt. - Capability inventory: The skill can invoke parallel LLM instances via
invoke_parallel, perform single-agent evaluations viainvoke_claude, and write markdown files to the local file system using the--outputparameter. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of string escaping, validation, or filtering of user-supplied content before it is processed by the model.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script uses
sys.path.insertto dynamically include/home/claudeand/mnt/skills/user/orchestrating-agents/scriptsat runtime to resolve dependencies such asclaude_clientandmuninn_utils. While common for dependency management in specific agent environments, loading code from hardcoded absolute paths can be a security concern if the environment is not strictly managed.
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