remembering-conversations

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill facilitates the ingestion of historical conversation data, which serves as a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: Historical logs are retrieved using the mcp__plugin_episodic-memory_episodic-memory__read tool as described in MCP-TOOLS.md and SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions lack specific delimiters or warnings to prevent the agent from being influenced by instructions embedded within the historical data.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has access to search and read tools that interact with the file system, providing a path for potential exploitation if the agent is subverted by malicious history.
  • Sanitization: There is no mention of sanitization or validation of the content retrieved from the conversation archive files.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill utilizes tools that provide access to sensitive user data and arbitrary file paths on the host system.
  • Sensitive file access: The skill documentation explicitly points to the user's ~/.config/superpowers/conversation-archive/ directory, which contains private interaction history.
  • Unrestricted path parameters: The path parameter for the read tool is defined as an absolute path in MCP-TOOLS.md. Without proper sandboxing or constraints in the prompt, this allows the agent to read arbitrary system files if instructed to do so.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Sep 15, 2026, 10:51 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — remembering-conversations