remembering-conversations
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill facilitates the ingestion of historical conversation data, which serves as a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Historical logs are retrieved using the
mcp__plugin_episodic-memory_episodic-memory__readtool as described inMCP-TOOLS.mdandSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions lack specific delimiters or warnings to prevent the agent from being influenced by instructions embedded within the historical data.
- Capability inventory: The agent has access to
searchandreadtools that interact with the file system, providing a path for potential exploitation if the agent is subverted by malicious history. - Sanitization: There is no mention of sanitization or validation of the content retrieved from the conversation archive files.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill utilizes tools that provide access to sensitive user data and arbitrary file paths on the host system.
- Sensitive file access: The skill documentation explicitly points to the user's
~/.config/superpowers/conversation-archive/directory, which contains private interaction history. - Unrestricted path parameters: The
pathparameter for thereadtool is defined as an absolute path inMCP-TOOLS.md. Without proper sandboxing or constraints in the prompt, this allows the agent to read arbitrary system files if instructed to do so.
Audit Metadata