github-branch-policy
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [Indirect Prompt Injection] (HIGH): The skill carries a high risk of indirect injection because it processes untrusted data from a repository and uses it in security-sensitive operations.
- Ingestion points: Data enters via
gh api(rulesets, PR lists) andgh workflow view(YAML contents) as seen throughoutSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: There are no boundary markers or explicit instructions to ignore instructions embedded in the analyzed repository content.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses write-level capabilities including
gh workflow disableandgit push origin --delete(Sections 6, 7, and 10). - Sanitization: The skill does not sanitize or escape data before it is interpreted by the agent or interpolated into shell commands.
- [Command Execution] (HIGH): Several remediation steps in
SKILL.md(specifically Section 10) direct the agent to execute commands likegit push origin --delete "<branch>". If a branch name is maliciously crafted with shell metacharacters (e.g.,"; rm -rf /; #), it could lead to arbitrary command execution on the runner. - [Data Exposure] (INFO): The skill accesses repository configuration and Actions workflow metadata. While this is required for the audit, it confirms that the skill has access to potentially sensitive repository structure and policy information.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata