watchlist
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 3, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
Bashtool to execute a Python script. The script location is hardcoded as an absolute path specific to a local user's environment (/Users/kikuchihiroyuki/...), which can lead to failures or unexpected behavior in different environments. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The script is susceptible to path traversal. The
nameparameter, sourced from user-controlled$ARGUMENTS, is used directly inos.path.joinwithout sanitization. An attacker could provide a name like../../target_fileto read or write JSON files outside the intendeddata/watchlistsdirectory. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The script dynamically modifies the
sys.pathusingsys.path.insert(0, ...)to include parent directories and then attempts to import local modules (src.data.graph_store,src.data.history_store) that are not part of the provided skill files. This behavior can be exploited if an attacker can place malicious code in those relative paths. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external data from local JSON files that could contain malicious instructions.
- Ingestion points:
manage_watchlist.pyreads and displays stock symbol lists from files in thedata/watchlists/directory. - Boundary markers: No delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands are used when outputting file contents to the agent.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses filesystem read/write capabilities and is executed via the
Bashtool. - Sanitization: There is no validation or sanitization of the input arguments or the content retrieved from the JSON files.
Audit Metadata