codex-tmux-echo
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 22, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The primary function of this skill is to execute arbitrary commands and keystrokes within tmux sessions. While this is the intended purpose, it grants the agent significant control over the local shell environment. The skill mitigates this risk with a 'risk-gate' in
scripts/dispatch.shthat checks for high-risk patterns likesudo,rm -rf /, and modifications to system directories. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill uses
tmux capture-paneinscripts/tmuxctl.shto read the contents of terminal windows. This is used for 'readiness' detection but could expose sensitive information (secrets, tokens) if they are displayed on the screen during a session. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill includes instructions in
scripts/dispatch.shandscripts/interactive_runner.shthat direct the AI agent not to inspect the skill's own source code or scripts unless absolutely necessary. While likely intended to reduce distraction or token usage, it is a form of behavioral override. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The 'backchannel' reporting system allows output from one tmux session (worker) to be fed into another session (controller/scheduler). This creates a surface where untrusted data could influence the behavior of the controller agent.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the agent context through the
reportsubcommand inscripts/tmuxctl.shand is processed by the scheduler instructions inscripts/start_scheduler.sh. - Boundary markers: The skill uses a specific prefix
ECHO-REPORT:to identify incoming worker reports. - Capability inventory: The agent receiving the reports has the capability to execute system commands and dispatch further tasks via the
dispatch.shscript. - Sanitization: The skill does not currently perform sanitization or escaping of the report content before it is injected into the controller's tmux pane.
Audit Metadata