lossless-claw-use
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 12, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Instructions in
reference/tui.mdrecommend downloading pre-compiled binaries fromgithub.com/Martian-Engineering/lossless-claw/releases, which is an untrusted third-party repository. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill directs users to install a Go-based tool via
go install github.com/Martian-Engineering/lossless-claw/tui@latest, which involves downloading and executing code from an external repository. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides complex shell instructions in
reference/fts5.mdfor cloning the Node.js source, patching build files, and compiling a custom runtime. It also instructs the user to modify a macOS LaunchAgent plist (~/Library/LaunchAgents/ai.openclaw.gateway.plist) and uselaunchctlto manage a persistent background service. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill documentation (e.g.,
reference/architecture.mdandreference/tui.md) describes accessing sensitive configuration and credential files, such as~/.openclaw/openclaw.jsonand environment variables likeANTHROPIC_API_KEY, to facilitate LLM provider authentication. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and summarize untrusted conversation data and tool outputs, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Conversation history from SQLite databases (
lcm.db) and JSONL session files. - Boundary markers: Employs XML delimiters (e.g.,
<summary>,<content>,<parents>) to encapsulate processed data as described inreference/architecture.md. - Capability inventory: Spawns sub-agents for DAG expansion and interacts with the local file system for storage of large files intercepted from tool outputs.
- Sanitization: Implements a three-level prompt escalation strategy (Normal -> Aggressive -> Fallback) and deterministic truncation to mitigate risks from malformed or malicious LLM outputs.
Audit Metadata