mem-skill
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 3, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill facilitates the global installation of an external Node.js package,
@tobilu/qmd, via thenpm install -gcommand during its initialization process if the QMD memory engine is selected. This package originates from a source that is not listed as a trusted vendor or a well-known service. Additionally, the skill utilizesnpxto check the status of the tool, which may also trigger downloads from the NPM registry. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill has an extensive command execution footprint. It relies on executing shell commands for its core functionality, including the
qmdCLI for semantic search and indexing,sedfor in-place configuration file modification, andpython3 -cfor JSON parsing and version management across several scripts (init.sh,bump-version.sh, andpackage.sh). - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is inherently vulnerable to indirect prompt injection due to its design as a retrieval-augmented memory system. It automatically reads and injects content from local Markdown files into the agent's conversation context without sufficient sanitization or the use of boundary delimiters.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the context from files located in
knowledge-base/*.mdandexperience/*.md, which are updated based on past conversations. - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands are used when retrieving and inserting knowledge or experience entries.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant capabilities, including filesystem write access and the ability to execute shell commands via subprocesses.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of validation or escaping of the Markdown content before it is interpolated into the agent's prompts.
Audit Metadata