skills/olorehq/olore/download-docs/Gen Agent Trust Hub

download-docs

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 1, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Shell command injection vulnerability. The skill extracts {config_name} and {version} directly from user-provided $ARGUMENTS and interpolates them into several shell commands without sanitization or validation.
  • Evidence: cat vault/configs/{config_name}.json and bash -c 'source ... && download_from_github ... "{version}"'.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Path traversal vulnerability. The use of user-controlled variables in file paths allows an attacker to access or manipulate files outside the intended vault/ directory using ../ sequences.
  • Evidence: cat vault/configs/{config_name}.json can be manipulated to read arbitrary system files if the agent has permissions.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Indirect prompt injection surface during the file filtering stage.
  • Ingestion points: In Step 5, the agent reads the first 20-30 lines of markdown files (.md, .mdx) downloaded from external GitHub repositories or URLs.
  • Boundary markers: Absent. The skill description does not specify the use of delimiters or instructions to the agent to disregard instructions found within the downloaded content.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to delete files (rm) and directories (find -delete) and execute local shell scripts via bash -c.
  • Sanitization: Absent. The agent is instructed to evaluate raw content from external files to make decisions about which files to delete.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Mar 1, 2026, 01:09 AM