cloudflare-deploy
Audited by Runlayer on Feb 21, 2026
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Tool: LICENSE.txt [1/2] Description: Apache License Version 2.0, January 2004 http://www.apache.org/licenses/ TERMS AND CONDITIONS FOR USE, REPRODUCTION, AND DISTRIBUTION 1.
Tool: LICENSE.txt [2/2] Description: this License.
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Tool: SKILL.md Description: --- name: cloudflare-deploy description: Deploy applications and infrastructure to Cloudflare using Workers, Pages, and related platform services. Use when the user asks to deploy, host, publish, or set up a project on Cloudflare.
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Tool: agents/openai.yaml Description: interface: display_name: "Cloudflare Deploy"
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Tool: references/agents-sdk/README.md Description: # Cloudflare Agents SDK Cloudflare Agents SDK enables building AI-powered agents on Durable Objects with state, WebSockets, SQL, scheduling, and AI integration.
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Tool: references/agents-sdk/api.md Description: # API Reference ## Agent Classes ### AIChatAgent For AI chat with auto-streaming, message history, tools, resumable streaming.
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Tool: references/agents-sdk/configuration.md Description: # Configuration ## Wrangler Setup ```jsonc { "name": "my-agents-app", "durable_objects": { "bindings": [ {"name": "MyAgent", "class_name": "MyAgent"} ] }, "migrations": [ {"tag": "v1", "new_sqlite_classes": ["MyAgent"]} ], "ai": { "binding": "AI" } } ``` ## Environment Bindings **Type-safe pattern:** ```typescript interface Env { AI?: Ai; // Workers AI MyAgent?: DurableObjectNamespace<MyAgent>; ChatAgent?: Dur
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Tool: references/agents-sdk/gotchas.md Description: # Gotchas & Best Practices ## Common Errors ### "setState() not syncing" **Cause:** Mutating state directly or not calling `setState()` after modifications **Solution:** Always use `setState()` with immutable updates: ```ts // ❌ this.state.count++ // ✅ this.setState({...this.state, count: this.state.count + 1}) ``` ### "Message history grows unbounded (AIChatAgent)" **Cause:** `this.messages` in `AIChatAgent` accumulates all messages indefinite
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Tool: references/agents-sdk/patterns.md Description: # Patterns & Use Cases ## AI Chat w/Tools **Server (AIChatAgent):** ```ts import { AIChatAgent } from "agents"; import { openai } from "@ai-sdk/openai"; import { tool } from "ai"; import { z } from "zod"; export class ChatAgent extends AIChatAgent<Env> { async onChatMessage(onFinish) { return this.streamText({ model: openai("gpt-4"), messages: this.messages, // Auto-managed tools: { getWeather: tool({ description: "Get current weather", parame
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Tool: references/ai-gateway/README.md Description: # Cloudflare AI Gateway Expert guidance for implementing Cloudflare AI Gateway - a universal gateway for AI model providers with analytics, caching, rate limiting, and routing capabilities.
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Tool: references/ai-gateway/configuration.md Description: # Configuration & Setup ## Creating a Gateway ### Dashboard AI > AI Gateway > Create Gateway > Configure (auth, caching, rate limiting, logging) ### API ```bash curl -X POST https://api.cloudflare.com/client/v4/accounts/{account_id}/ai-gateway/gateways \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $CF_API_TOKEN" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"id":"my-gateway","cache_ttl":3600,"rate_limiting_interval":60,"rate_limiting_limit":100,"collect_logs"
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Tool: references/ai-gateway/dynamic-routing.md Description: # Dynamic Routing Configure complex routing in dashboard without code changes.
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Tool: references/ai-gateway/features.md Description: # Features & Capabilities ## Caching Dashboard: Settings → Cache Responses → Enable ```typescript // Custom TTL (1 hour) headers: { 'cf-aig-cache-ttl': '3600' } // Skip cache headers: { 'cf-aig-skip-cache': 'true' } // Custom cache key headers: { 'cf-aig-cache-key': 'greeting-en' } ``` **Limits:** TTL 60s - 30 days.
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Tool: references/ai-gateway/sdk-integration.md Description: # AI Gateway SDK Integration ## Vercel AI SDK (Recommended) ```typescript import { createAiGateway } from 'ai-gateway-provider'; import { createOpenAI } from '@ai-sdk/openai'; import { generateText } from 'ai'; const gateway = createAiGateway({ accountId: process.env.CF_ACCOUNT_ID, gateway: process.env.CF_GATEWAY_ID, apiKey: process.env.CF_API_TOKEN // Optional for auth gateways }); const openai = createOpenAI({ apiKey: process.env.OPEN
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Tool: references/ai-gateway/troubleshooting.md Description: # AI Gateway Troubleshooting ## Common Errors | Error | Cause | Fix | |-------|-------|-----| | 401 | Missing `cf-aig-authorization` header | Add header with CF API token | | 403 | Invalid provider key / BYOK expired | Check provider key in dashboard | | 429 | Rate limit exceeded | Increase limit or implement backoff | ### 401 Fix ```typescript const client = new OpenAI({ baseURL: `https://gateway.ai.cloudflare.com/v1/${accountId}/${gat
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Tool: references/ai-search/README.md Description: # Cloudflare AI Search Reference Expert guidance for implementing Cloudflare AI Search (formerly AutoRAG), Cloudflare's managed semantic search and RAG service.
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Tool: references/ai-search/api.md Description: # AI Search API Reference ## Workers Binding ```typescript const answer = await env.AI.autorag("instance-name").aiSearch(options); const results = await env.AI.autorag("instance-name").search(options); const instances = await env.AI.autorag("_").listInstances(); ``` ## aiSearch() Options ```typescript interface AiSearchOptions { query: string; // User query model: string; // Workers AI model ID syste
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Tool: references/ai-search/configuration.md Description: # AI Search Configuration ## Worker Setup ```jsonc // wrangler.jsonc { "ai": { "binding": "AI" } } ``` ```typescript interface Env { AI: Ai; } const answer = await env.AI.autorag("my-instance").aiSearch({ query: "How do I configure caching?", model: "@cf/meta/llama-3.3-70b-instruct-fp8-fast" }); ``` ## Data Sources ### R2 Bucket Dashboard: AI Search → Create Instance → Select R2 bucket **Supported formats:** `.md`, `.txt`, `.html`, `.pdf`,
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Tool: references/ai-search/gotchas.md Description: # AI Search Gotchas ## Type Safety **Timestamp precision:** Use seconds (10-digit), not milliseconds.
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Tool: references/ai-search/patterns.md Description: # AI Search Patterns ## search() vs aiSearch() | Use | Method | Returns | |-----|--------|---------| | Custom UI, analytics | `search()` | Raw chunks only (~100-300ms) | | Chatbots, Q&A | `aiSearch()` | AI response + chunks (~500-2000ms) | ## rewrite_query | Setting | Use When | |---------|----------| | `true` | User input (typos, vague queries) | | `false` | LLM-generated queries (already optimized) | ## Multitenancy (Folder-Based) ```typescri
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Tool: references/analytics-engine/README.md Description: # Cloudflare Workers Analytics Engine Reference Expert guidance for implementing unlimited-cardinality analytics at scale using Cloudflare Workers Analytics Engine.
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Tool: references/analytics-engine/api.md Description: # Analytics Engine API Reference ## Writing Data ### `writeDataPoint()` Fire-and-forget (returns `void`, not Promise).
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Tool: references/analytics-engine/configuration.md Description: # Analytics Engine Configuration ## Setup 1.
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Tool: references/analytics-engine/gotchas.md Description: # Analytics Engine Gotchas ## Critical Issues ### Sampling at High Volumes **Problem:** Queries return fewer points than written at >1M writes/min.
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Tool: references/analytics-engine/patterns.md Description: # Analytics Engine Patterns ## Use Cases | Use Case | Key Metrics | Index On | |----------|-------------|----------| | API Metering | requests, bytes, compute_units | api_key | | Feature Usage | feature, action, duration | user_id | | Error Tracking | error_type, endpoint, count | customer_id | | Performance | latency_ms, cache_status | endpoint | | A/B Testing | variant, conversions | user_id | ## API Metering (Billing) ```typescript en
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Tool: references/api-shield/README.md Description: # Cloudflare API Shield Reference Expert guidance for API Shield - comprehensive API security suite for discovery, protection, and monitoring.
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Tool: references/api-shield/api.md Description: # API Reference Base: `/zones/{zone_id}/api_gateway` ## Endpoints ```bash GET /operations # List GET /operations/{op_id} # Get single POST /operations/item # Create: {endpoint,host,method} POST /operations # Bulk: {operations:[{endpoint,host,method}]} DELETE /operations/{op_id} # Delete DELETE /operations # Bulk delete: {operation_ids:[...]} ``` ## Discovery ```bas
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Tool: references/api-shield/configuration.md Description: # Configuration ## Schema Validation 2.0 Setup > ⚠️ **Classic Schema Validation deprecated.** Use Schema Validation 2.0.
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Tool: references/api-shield/gotchas.md Description: # Gotchas & Troubleshooting ## Common Errors ### "Schema Validation 2.0 not working after migration" **Cause:** Classic rules still active, conflicting with new system **Solution:** 1. Delete ALL Classic schema validation rules 2. Clear Cloudflare cache (wait 5 min) 3.
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Tool: references/api-shield/patterns.md Description: # Patterns & Use Cases ## Protect API with Schema + JWT ```bash # 1.
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Tool: references/api/README.md Description: # Cloudflare API Integration Guide for working with Cloudflare's REST API - authentication, SDK usage, common patterns, and troubleshooting.
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Tool: references/api/api.md Description: # API Reference ## Client Initialization ### TypeScript ```typescript import Cloudflare from 'cloudflare'; const client = new Cloudflare({ apiToken: process.env.CLOUDFLARE_API_TOKEN, }); ``` ### Python ```python from cloudflare import Cloudflare client = Cloudflare(api_token=os.environ.get("CLOUDFLARE_API_TOKEN")) # For async: from cloudflare import AsyncCloudflare client = AsyncCloudflare(api_token=os.environ["CLOUDFLARE_API_TOKEN"]) ``` ### Go ```go imp
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Tool: references/api/configuration.md Description: # Configuration ## Environment Variables ### Set Variables | Platform | Command | |----------|---------| | Linux/macOS | `export CLOUDFLARE_API_TOKEN='token'` | | PowerShell | `$env:CLOUDFLARE_API_TOKEN = 'token'` | | Windows CMD | `set CLOUDFLARE_API_TOKEN=token` | **Security:** Never commit tokens.
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Tool: references/api/gotchas.md Description: # Gotchas & Troubleshooting ## Rate Limits & 429 Errors **Actual Limits:** - **1200 requests / 5 minutes** per user/token (global) - **200 requests / second** per IP address - **GraphQL: 320 / 5 minutes** (cost-based) **SDK Behavior:** - Auto-retry with exponential backoff (default 2 retries, Go: 10) - Respects `Retry-After` header - Throws `RateLimitError` after exhausting retries **Solution:** ```typescript // Increase retries for rate-limit-heavy w
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Tool: references/api/patterns.md Description: # Common Patterns ## List All with Auto-Pagination **Problem:** API returns paginated results.
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Tool: references/argo-smart-routing/README.md Description: # Cloudflare Argo Smart Routing Skill Reference ## Overview Cloudflare Argo Smart Routing is a performance optimization service that detects real-time network issues and routes web traffic across the most efficient network path.
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Tool: references/argo-smart-routing/api.md Description: ## API Reference **Note on Smart Shield:** Argo Smart Routing is being integrated into Cloudflare's Smart Shield product.
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Tool: references/argo-smart-routing/configuration.md Description: ## Configuration Management **Note on Smart Shield Evolution:** Argo Smart Routing is being integrated into Smart Shield.
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Tool: references/argo-smart-routing/gotchas.md Description: ## Best Practices Summary **Smart Shield Note:** Argo Smart Routing evolving into Smart Shield. Best practices below remain applicable; monitor Cloudflare changelog for Smart Shield updates.
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Tool: references/argo-smart-routing/patterns.md Description: # Integration Patterns ## Enable Argo + Tiered Cache ```typescript async function enableOptimalPerformance(client: Cloudflare, zoneId: string) { await Promise.all([ client.argo.smartRouting.edit({ zone_id: zoneId, value: 'on' }), client.argo.tieredCaching.edit({ zone_id: zoneId, value: 'on' }), ]); } ``` **Flow:** Visitor → Edge (Lower-Tier) → [Cache Miss] → Upper-Tier → [Cache Miss + Argo] → Origin **Impact:** Argo ~30% latency reduct
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Tool: references/bindings/README.md Description: # Cloudflare Bindings Skill Reference Expert guidance on Cloudflare Workers Bindings - the runtime APIs that connect Workers to Cloudflare platform resources.
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Tool: references/bindings/api.md Description: # Bindings API Reference ## TypeScript Types Cloudflare generates binding types via `npx wrangler types`.
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Tool: references/bindings/configuration.md Description: # Binding Configuration Reference ## Storage Bindings ```jsonc { "kv_namespaces": [{ "binding": "MY_KV", "id": "..." }], "r2_buckets": [{ "binding": "MY_BUCKET", "bucket_name": "my-bucket" }], "d1_databases": [{ "binding": "DB", "database_name": "my-db", "database_id": "..." }], "durable_objects": { "bindings": [{ "name": "MY_DO", "class_name": "MyDO" }] }, "vectorize": [{ "binding": "VECTORIZE", "index_name": "my-index" }], "queues": { "pr
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Tool: references/bindings/gotchas.md Description: # Binding Gotchas and Troubleshooting ## Critical: Global Scope Mutation ### ❌ THE #1 GOTCHA: Caching env in Global Scope ```typescript // ❌ DANGEROUS - env cached at deploy time const apiKey = env.API_KEY; // ERROR: env not available in global scope export default { async fetch(request: Request, env: Env) { // Uses undefined or stale value!
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Tool: references/bindings/patterns.md Description: # Binding Patterns and Best Practices ## Service Binding Patterns ### RPC via Service Bindings ```typescript // auth-worker export default { async fetch(request: Request, env: Env) { const token = request.headers.get('Authorization'); return new Response(JSON.stringify({ valid: await validateToken(token) })); } } // api-worker const response = await env.AUTH_SERVICE.fetch( new Request('https://fake-host/validate', { headers: { 'Authorization': t
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Tool: references/bot-management/README.md Description: # Cloudflare Bot Management Enterprise-grade bot detection, protection, and mitigation using ML/heuristics, bot scores, JavaScript detections, and verified bot handling.
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Tool: references/bot-management/api.md Description: # Bot Management API ## Workers: BotManagement Interface ```typescript interface BotManagement { score: number; // 1-99 (Enterprise), 0 if not computed verifiedBot: boolean; // Is verified bot staticResource: boolean; // Serves static resource ja3Hash: string; // JA3 fingerprint (Enterprise, HTTPS only) ja4: string; // JA4 fingerprint (Enterprise, HTTPS only) jsDetection?: { passed: boolean;
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Tool: references/bot-management/configuration.md Description: # Bot Management Configuration ## Product Tiers **Note:** Dashboard paths differ between old and new UI: - **New:** Security > Settings > Filter "Bot traffic" - **Old:** Security > Bots Both UIs access same settings.
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Tool: references/bot-management/gotchas.md Description: # Bot Management Gotchas ## Common Errors ### "Bot Score = 0" **Cause:** Bot Management didn't run (internal Cloudflare request, Worker routing to zone (Orange-to-Orange), or request handled before BM (Redirect Rules, etc.)) **Solution:** Check request flow and ensure Bot Management runs in request lifecycle ### "JavaScript Detections Not Working" **Cause:** `js_detection.passed` always false or undefined due to: CSP headers don't allow `/c
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Tool: references/bot-management/patterns.md Description: # Bot Management Patterns ## E-commerce Protection ```txt # High security for checkout (cf.bot_management.score lt 50 and http.request.uri.path in {"/checkout" "/cart/add"} and not cf.bot_management.verified_bot and not cf.bot_management.corporate_proxy) Action: Managed Challenge ``` ## API Protection ```txt # Protect API with JS detection + score (http.request.uri.path matches "^/api/" and (cf.bot_management.score lt 30 or not cf.bot_mana
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Tool: references/browser-rendering/README.md Description: # Cloudflare Browser Rendering Skill Reference **Description**: Expert knowledge for Cloudflare Browser Rendering - control headless Chrome on Cloudflare's global network for browser automation, screenshots, PDFs, web scraping, testing, and content generation.
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Tool: references/browser-rendering/api.md Description: # Browser Rendering API ## REST API **Base:** `https://api.cloudflare.com/client/v4/accounts/{accountId}/browser-rendering` **Auth:** `Authorization: Bearer <token>` (Browser Rendering - Edit permission) ### Endpoints | Endpoint | Description | Key Options | |----------|-------------|-------------| | `/content` | Get rendered HTML | `url`, `waitUntil` | | `/screenshot` | Capture image | `screenshotOptions: {type, fullPage, clip}` | | `/pdf`
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Tool: references/browser-rendering/configuration.md Description: # Configuration & Setup ## Installation ```bash npm install @cloudflare/puppeteer # or @cloudflare/playwright ``` **Use Cloudflare packages** - standard `puppeteer`/`playwright` won't work in Workers.
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Tool: references/browser-rendering/gotchas.md Description: # Browser Rendering Gotchas ## Tier Limits | Limit | Free | Paid | |-------|------|------| | Daily browser time | 10 min | Unlimited* | | Concurrent sessions | 3 | 30 | | Requests/minute | 6 | 180 | | Session keep-alive | 10 min max | 10 min max | *Subject to fair-use policy.
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Tool: references/browser-rendering/patterns.md Description: # Browser Rendering Patterns ## Basic Worker ```typescript import puppeteer from "@cloudflare/puppeteer"; export default { async fetch(request, env) { const browser = await puppeteer.launch(env.MYBROWSER); try { const page = await browser.newPage(); await page.goto("https://example.com"); return new Response(await page.content()); } finally { await browser.close(); // ALWAYS in finally } } }; ``` ## Session Reuse Keep sessions alive for
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Tool: references/c3/README.md Description: # C3 (create-cloudflare) Official CLI for scaffolding Cloudflare Workers and Pages projects with templates, TypeScript, and instant deployment.
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Tool: references/c3/api.md Description: # C3 CLI Reference ## Invocation ```bash npm create cloudflare@latest [name] [-- flags] # NPM requires -- yarn create cloudflare [name] [flags] pnpm create cloudflare@latest [name] [-- flags] ``` ## Core Flags | Flag | Values | Description | |------|--------|-------------| | `--type` | `hello-world`, `web-app`, `demo`, `pre-existing`, `remote-template` | Application type | | `--platform` | `workers` (default), `pages` | Target platform | | `--framework` |
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Tool: references/c3/configuration.md Description: # C3 Generated Configuration ## Output Structure ``` my-app/ ├── src/index.ts # Worker entry point ├── wrangler.jsonc # Cloudflare config ├── package.json # Scripts ├── tsconfig.json └── .gitignore ``` ## wrangler.jsonc ```jsonc { "$schema": "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/cloudflare/workers-sdk/main/packages/wrangler/config-schema.json", "name": "my-app", "main": "src/index.ts", "compatibility_date": "2026-01-27" } ``
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Tool: references/c3/gotchas.md Description: # C3 Troubleshooting ## Deployment Issues ### Placeholder IDs **Error:** "Invalid namespace ID" **Fix:** Replace placeholders in wrangler.jsonc with real IDs: ```bash npx wrangler kv namespace create MY_KV # Get real ID ``` ### Authentication **Error:** "Not authenticated" **Fix:** `npx wrangler login` or set `CLOUDFLARE_API_TOKEN` ### Name Conflict **Error:** "Worker already exists" **Fix:** Change `name` in wrangler.jsonc ## Platform Selection | Nee
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Tool: references/c3/patterns.md Description: # C3 Usage Patterns ## Quick Workflows ```bash # TypeScript API Worker npm create cloudflare@latest my-api -- --type=hello-world --lang=ts --deploy # Next.js on Pages npm create cloudflare@latest my-app -- --type=web-app --framework=next --platform=pages --ts --deploy # Astro static site npm create cloudflare@latest my-blog -- --type=web-app --framework=astro --platform=pages --ts ``` ## CI/CD (GitHub Actions) ```yaml - name: Deploy run: npm run deplo
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Tool: references/cache-reserve/README.md Description: # Cloudflare Cache Reserve **Persistent cache storage built on R2 for long-term content retention** ## Smart Shield Integration Cache Reserve is part of **Smart Shield**, Cloudflare's comprehensive security and performance suite: - **Smart Shield Advanced tier**: Includes 2TB Cache Reserve storage - **Standalone purchase**: Available separately if not using Smart Shield - **Migration**: Existing standalone customers can migrate to Smart Shiel
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Tool: references/cache-reserve/api.md Description: # Cache Reserve API ## Workers Integration ``` ┌────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ │ CRITICAL: Workers Cache API ≠ Cache Reserve │ │ │ │ • Workers caches.default / cache.put() → edge cache ONLY │ │ • Cache Reserve → zone-level setting, automatic, no per-req │ │ • You CANNOT selectively write to Cache Reserve from Workers │ │ •
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Tool: references/cache-reserve/configuration.md Description: # Cache Reserve Configuration ## Dashboard Setup **Minimum steps to enable:** ```bash # Navigate to dashboard https://dash.cloudflare.com/caching/cache-reserve # Click "Enable Storage Sync" or "Purchase" button ``` **Prerequisites:** - Paid Cache Reserve plan or Smart Shield Advanced required - Tiered Cache **required** for Cache Reserve to function optimally ## API Configuration ### REST API ```bash # Enable curl -X PATCH "https://api
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Tool: references/cache-reserve/gotchas.md Description: # Cache Reserve Gotchas ## Common Errors ### "Assets Not Being Cached in Cache Reserve" **Cause:** Asset is not cacheable, TTL < 10 hours, Content-Length header missing, or blocking headers present (Set-Cookie, Vary: *) **Solution:** Ensure minimum TTL of 10+ hours (`Cache-Control: public, max-age=36000`), add Content-Length header, remove Set-Cookie header, and set `Vary: Accept-Encoding` (not *) ### "Range Requests Not Working" (Video Seek
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Tool: references/cache-reserve/patterns.md Description: # Cache Reserve Patterns ## Best Practices ### 1.
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Tool: references/containers/README.md Description: # Cloudflare Containers Skill Reference **APPLIES TO: Cloudflare Containers ONLY - NOT general Cloudflare Workers** Use when working with Cloudflare Containers: deploying containerized apps on Workers platform, configuring container-enabled Durable Objects, managing container lifecycle, or implementing stateful/stateless container patterns.
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Tool: references/containers/api.md Description: ## Container Class API ```typescript import { Container } from "@cloudflare/containers"; export class MyContainer extends Container { defaultPort = 8080; requiredPorts = [8080]; sleepAfter = "30m"; enableInternet = true; pingEndpoint = "/health"; envVars = {}; entrypoint = []; onStart() { /* container started */ } onStop() { /* container stopping */ } onError(error: Error) { /* container error */ } onActivityExpired(): boolean { /* timeout, return
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Tool: references/containers/configuration.md Description: ## Wrangler Configuration ### Basic Container Config ```jsonc { "name": "my-worker", "main": "src/index.ts", "compatibility_date": "2026-01-10", "containers": [ { "class_name": "MyContainer", "image": "./Dockerfile", // Path to Dockerfile or directory with Dockerfile "instance_type": "standard-1", // Predefined or custom (see below) "max_instances": 10 } ], "durable_objects": { "bindings": [ { "name": "MY_CONTAINER", "class_name": "MyCo
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Tool: references/containers/gotchas.md Description: ## Critical Gotchas ### ⚠️ WebSocket: fetch() vs containerFetch() **Problem:** WebSocket connections fail silently **Cause:** `containerFetch()` doesn't support WebSocket upgrades **Fix:** Always use `fetch()` for WebSocket ```typescript // ❌ WRONG return container.containerFetch(request); // ✅ CORRECT return container.fetch(request); ``` ### ⚠️ startAndWaitForPorts() vs start() **Problem:** "connection refused" after `start()` **Cause:** `star
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Tool: references/containers/patterns.md Description: ## Routing Patterns ### Session Affinity (Stateful) ```typescript export class SessionBackend extends Container { defaultPort = 3000; sleepAfter = "30m"; } export default { async fetch(request: Request, env: Env) { const sessionId = request.headers.get("X-Session-ID") || crypto.randomUUID(); const container = env.SESSION_BACKEND.getByName(sessionId); await container.startAndWaitForPorts(); return container.fetch(request); } }; ``` **Use:** Use
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Tool: references/cron-triggers/README.md Description: # Cloudflare Cron Triggers Schedule Workers execution using cron expressions.
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Tool: references/cron-triggers/api.md Description: # Cron Triggers API ## Basic Handler ```typescript export default { async scheduled(controller: ScheduledController, env: Env, ctx: ExecutionContext): Promise<void> { console.log("Cron executed:", new Date(controller.scheduledTime)); }, }; ``` **JavaScript:** Same signature without types **Python:** `class Default(WorkerEntrypoint): async def scheduled(self, controller, env, ctx)` ## ScheduledController ```typescript interface ScheduledControlle
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Tool: references/cron-triggers/configuration.md Description: # Cron Triggers Configuration ## wrangler.jsonc ```jsonc { "$schema": "./node_modules/wrangler/config-schema.json", "name": "my-cron-worker", "main": "src/index.ts", "compatibility_date": "2025-01-01", // Use current date for new projects "triggers": { "crons": [ "*/5 * * * *", // Every 5 minutes "0 */2 * * *", // Every 2 hours "0 9 * * MON-FRI", // Weekdays at 9am UTC "0 2 1 * *" // Monthly on 1st at 2am UTC ] } } ``` #
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Tool: references/cron-triggers/gotchas.md Description: # Cron Triggers Gotchas ## Common Errors ### "Timezone Issues" **Problem:** Cron runs at wrong time relative to local timezone **Cause:** All crons execute in UTC, no local timezone support **Solution:** Convert local time to UTC manually **Conversion formula:** `utcHour = (localHour - utcOffset + 24) % 24` **Examples:** - 9am PST (UTC-8) → `(9 - (-8) + 24) % 24 = 17` → `0 17 * * *` - 2am EST (UTC-5) → `(2 - (-5) + 24) % 24 = 7` → `0 7 * * *
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Tool: references/cron-triggers/patterns.md Description: # Cron Triggers Patterns ## API Data Sync ```typescript export default { async scheduled(controller, env, ctx) { const response = await fetch("https://api.example.com/data", {headers: { "Authorization": `Bearer ${env.API_KEY}` }}); if (!response.ok) throw new Error(`API error: ${response.status}`); ctx.waitUntil(env.MY_KV.put("cached_data", JSON.stringify(await response.json()), {expirationTtl: 3600})); }, }; ``` ## Database Cleanup ```type
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Tool: references/d1/README.md Description: # Cloudflare D1 Database Expert guidance for Cloudflare D1, a serverless SQLite database designed for horizontal scale-out across multiple databases.
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Tool: references/d1/api.md Description: # D1 API Reference ## Prepared Statements (Required for Security) ```typescript // ❌ NEVER: Direct string interpolation (SQL injection risk) const result = await env.DB.prepare(`SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = ${userId}`).all(); // ✅ CORRECT: Prepared statements with bind() const result = await env.DB.prepare('SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = ?').bind(userId).all(); // Multiple parameters const result = await env.DB.prepare('SELECT * FROM users WHERE email =
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Tool: references/d1/configuration.md Description: # D1 Configuration ## wrangler.jsonc Setup ```jsonc { "name": "your-worker-name", "main": "src/index.ts", "compatibility_date": "2025-01-01", // Use current date for new projects "d1_databases": [ { "binding": "DB", // Env variable name "database_name": "your-db-name", // Human-readable name "database_id": "your-database-id", // UUID from dashboard/CLI "migrations_dir": "migrations" // Optional: default is "migrations"
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Tool: references/d1/gotchas.md Description: # D1 Gotchas & Troubleshooting ## Common Errors ### "SQL Injection Vulnerability" **Cause:** Using string interpolation instead of prepared statements with bind() **Solution:** ALWAYS use prepared statements: `env.DB.prepare('SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = ?').bind(userId).all()` instead of string interpolation which allows attackers to inject malicious SQL ### "no such table" **Cause:** Table doesn't exist because migrations haven't been run, or using
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Tool: references/d1/patterns.md Description: # D1 Patterns & Best Practices ## Pagination ```typescript async function getUsers({ page, pageSize }: { page: number; pageSize: number }, env: Env) { const offset = (page - 1) * pageSize; const [countResult, dataResult] = await env.DB.batch([ env.DB.prepare('SELECT COUNT(*) as total FROM users'), env.DB.prepare('SELECT * FROM users ORDER BY created_at DESC LIMIT ?
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Tool: references/ddos/README.md Description: # Cloudflare DDoS Protection Autonomous, always-on protection against DDoS attacks across L3/4 and L7.
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```typescript import Cloudflare from "cloudflare"; const client = new Cloudflare({ apiToken: process.env.CLOUDFLARE_API_TOKEN }); // STEP 1: Discover managed ruleset ID (required for overrides) const allRulesets = await client.rulesets.list({ zone_id: zoneId }); const ddosRuleset = allRulesets.result.find( (r) => r.kind === "managed" && r.phase === "ddos_l7" ); if (!ddosRuleset) throw new Error("DDoS managed ruleset not found"); const managedRulesetId = ddosRuleset.id; // STEP 2: Get current HTT
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## Alerting Configure via Notifications: - Alert types: `http_ddos_attack_alert`, `layer_3_4_ddos_attack_alert`, `advanced_*` variants - Filters: zones, hostnames, RPS/PPS/Mbps thresholds, IPs, protocols - Mechanisms: email, webhooks, PagerDuty See [api.md](./api.md#alert-configuration) for API examples.
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Document all adjustments ## Best Practices - Test during low-traffic periods - Use zone-level for per-site tuning - Reference IP lists for easier management - Set appropriate alert thresholds (avoid noise) - Combine with WAF for layered defense - Avoid over-tuning (keep config simple) See [patterns.md](./patterns.md) for progressive rollout examples.
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Tool: references/ddos/patterns.md Description: # DDoS Protection Patterns ## Allowlist Trusted IPs ```typescript const config = { description: "Allowlist trusted IPs", rules: [{ expression: "ip.src in { 203.0.113.0/24 192.0.2.1 }", action: "execute", action_parameters: { id: managedRulesetId, overrides: { sensitivity_level: "eoff" }, }, }], }; await client.accounts.rulesets.phases.entrypoint.update("ddos_l7", { account_id: accountId, ...config, }); ``` ## Route-specific Sensitivity ```typescript
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## Overview DO Storage provides: - SQLite-backed (recommended) or KV-backed - SQL API + synchronous/async KV APIs - Automatic input/output gates (race-free) - 30-day point-in-time recovery (PITR) - Transactions and alarms **Use cases:** Stateful coordination, real-time collaboration, counters, sessions, rate limiters **Billing:** Charged by request, GB-month storage, and rowsRead/rowsWritten for SQL operations ## Quick Start ```typescript export class Counter extends DurableObject { sql: SqlStor
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Tool: references/do-storage/api.md Description: # DO Storage API Reference ## SQL API ```typescript const cursor = this.sql.exec('SELECT * FROM users WHERE email = ?', email); for (let row of cursor) {} // Objects: { id, name, email } cursor.toArray(); cursor.one(); // Single row (throws if != 1) for (let row of cursor.raw()) {} // Arrays: [1, "Alice", "..."] // Manual iteration const iter = cursor[Symbol.iterator](); const first = iter.next(); // { value: {...}, done: false } cursor.columnNames
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Tool: references/do-storage/configuration.md Description: # DO Storage Configuration ## SQLite-backed (Recommended) **wrangler.jsonc:** ```jsonc { "migrations": [ { "tag": "v1", "new_sqlite_classes": ["Counter", "Session", "RateLimiter"] } ] } ``` **Migration lifecycle:** Migrations run once per deployment.
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Tool: references/do-storage/gotchas.md Description: # DO Storage Gotchas & Troubleshooting ## Concurrency Model (CRITICAL) Durable Objects use **input/output gates** to prevent race conditions: ### Input Gates Block new requests during storage reads from CURRENT request: ```typescript // SAFE: Input gate active during await async increment() { const val = await this.ctx.storage.get("counter"); // Input gate blocks other requests await this.ctx.storage.put("counter", val + 1); return val; } ``` #
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Tool: references/do-storage/patterns.md Description: # DO Storage Patterns & Best Practices ## Schema Migration ```typescript export class MyDurableObject extends DurableObject { constructor(ctx: DurableObjectState, env: Env) { super(ctx, env); this.sql = ctx.storage.sql; // Use SQLite's built-in user_version pragma const ver = this.sql.exec("PRAGMA user_version").one()?.user_version || 0; if (ver === 0) { this.sql.exec(`CREATE TABLE users(id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY, name TEXT)`); this.sql.exec("PRA
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Tool: references/do-storage/testing.md Description: # DO Storage Testing Testing Durable Objects with storage using `vitest-pool-workers`.
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Tool: references/durable-objects/README.md Description: # Cloudflare Durable Objects Expert guidance for building stateful applications with Cloudflare Durable Objects. ## Reading Order 1.
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Tool: references/durable-objects/api.md Description: # Durable Objects API ## Class Structure ```typescript import { DurableObject } from "cloudflare:workers"; export class MyDO extends DurableObject<Env> { constructor(ctx: DurableObjectState, env: Env) { super(ctx, env); // Runs on EVERY wake - keep light!
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Tool: references/durable-objects/configuration.md Description: # Durable Objects Configuration ## Basic Setup ```jsonc { "name": "my-worker", "main": "src/index.ts", "compatibility_date": "2025-01-01", // Use latest; ≥2024-04-03 for RPC "durable_objects": { "bindings": [ { "name": "MY_DO", // Env binding name "class_name": "MyDO" // Class exported from this worker }, { "name": "EXTERNAL", // Access DO from another worker "class_name": "ExternalDO", "script_
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Tool: references/durable-objects/gotchas.md [1/2] Description: # Durable Objects Gotchas ## Common Errors ### "Hibernation Cleared My In-Memory State" **Problem:** Variables lost after hibernation **Cause:** DO auto-hibernates when idle; in-memory state not persisted **Solution:** Use `ctx.storage` for critical data, `ws.serializeAttachment()` for per-connection metadata ```typescript // ❌ Wrong - lost on hibernation private userCount = 0; async webSocketMessage(ws: WebSocket, msg: string) { thi
Tool: references/durable-objects/gotchas.md [2/2]
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Tool: references/durable-objects/patterns.md Description: # Durable Objects Patterns ## When to Use Which Pattern | Need | Pattern | ID Strategy | |------|---------|-------------| | Rate limit per user/IP | Rate Limiting | `idFromName(identifier)` | | Mutual exclusion | Distributed Lock | `idFromName(resource)` | | >1K req/s throughput | Sharding | `newUniqueId()` or hash | | Real-time updates | WebSocket Collab | `idFromName(room)` | | User sessions | Session Management | `idFromName(sessionId)
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Tool: references/email-routing/README.md Description: # Cloudflare Email Routing Skill Reference ## Overview Cloudflare Email Routing enables custom email addresses for your domain that route to verified destination addresses.
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Tool: references/email-routing/api.md Description: # Email Routing API Reference ## Worker Runtime API ### Email Handler Interface ```typescript interface ExportedHandler<Env = unknown> { email?(message: ForwardableEmailMessage, env: Env, ctx: ExecutionContext): void | Promise<void>; } ``` ### ForwardableEmailMessage Main interface for incoming emails: ```typescript interface ForwardableEmailMessage { readonly from: string; // Envelope sender (e.g., "sender@example.com") readonly to: st
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IN MX 1 isaac.mx.cloudflare.net.
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Tool: references/email-routing/gotchas.md Description: # Gotchas & Troubleshooting ## Critical Pitfalls ### Stream Consumption (MOST COMMON) **Problem:** "stream already consumed" or worker hangs **Cause:** `message.raw` is `ReadableStream` - consume once only **Solution:** ```typescript // ❌ WRONG const email1 = await parser.parse(await message.raw.arrayBuffer()); const email2 = await parser.parse(await message.raw.arrayBuffer()); // FAILS // ✅ CORRECT const raw = await message.raw.arrayBuffer(
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Allowlist/Blocklist ```typescript // Allowlist const allowed = ["user@example.com", "trusted@corp.com"]; if (!allowed.includes(message.from)) { message.setReject("Not allowed"); return; } await message.forward("inbox@corp.com"); ``` ## 2.
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Tool: references/email-workers/README.md Description: # Cloudflare Email Workers Process incoming emails programmatically using Cloudflare Workers runtime.
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Tool: references/email-workers/api.md Description: # Email Workers API Reference Complete API reference for Cloudflare Email Workers runtime.
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Tool: references/email-workers/configuration.md Description: # Email Workers Configuration ## wrangler.jsonc ```jsonc { "name": "email-worker", "main": "src/index.ts", "compatibility_date": "2025-01-27", "send_email": [ { "name": "EMAIL" }, // Unrestricted { "name": "EMAIL_LOGS", "destination_address": "logs@example.com" }, // Single dest { "name": "EMAIL_TEAM", "allowed_destination_addresses": ["a@ex.com", "b@ex.com"] }, { "name": "EMAIL_NOREPLY", "allowed_se
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Tool: references/email-workers/gotchas.md Description: # Email Workers Gotchas ## Critical Issues ### ReadableStream Single-Use ```typescript // ❌ WRONG: Stream consumed twice const email = await PostalMime.parse(await new Response(message.raw).arrayBuffer()); const rawText = await new Response(message.raw).text(); // EMPTY!
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Tool: references/email-workers/patterns.md Description: # Email Workers Patterns ## Parse Email ```typescript import PostalMime from 'postal-mime'; export default { async email(message, env, ctx) { const buffer = await new Response(message.raw).arrayBuffer(); const email = await PostalMime.parse(buffer); console.log(email.from, email.subject, email.text, email.attachments.length); await message.forward('inbox@example.com'); } }; ``` ## Filtering ```typescript // Allowlist from KV const allowList
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Tool: references/hyperdrive/README.md Description: # Hyperdrive Accelerates database queries from Workers via connection pooling, edge setup, query caching.
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Tool: references/hyperdrive/api.md Description: # API Reference See [README.md](./README.md) for overview, [configuration.md](./configuration.md) for setup.
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Tool: references/hyperdrive/configuration.md Description: # Configuration See [README.md](./README.md) for overview.
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Tool: references/hyperdrive/gotchas.md Description: # Gotchas See [README.md](./README.md), [configuration.md](./configuration.md), [api.md](./api.md), [patterns.md](./patterns.md).
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Tool: references/hyperdrive/patterns.md Description: # Patterns See [README.md](./README.md), [configuration.md](./configuration.md), [api.md](./api.md).
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Tool: references/images/README.md Description: # Cloudflare Images Skill Reference **Cloudflare Images** is an end-to-end image management solution providing storage, transformation, optimization, and delivery at scale via Cloudflare's global network.
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Tool: references/images/api.md Description: # API Reference ## Workers Binding API ```toml # wrangler.toml [images] binding = "IMAGES" ``` ### Transform Images ```typescript const imageResponse = await env.IMAGES .input(fileBuffer) .transform({ width: 800, height: 600, fit: "cover", quality: 85, format: "avif" }) .output(); return imageResponse.response(); ``` ### Transform Options ```typescript interface TransformOptions { width?: number; height?: number; fit?: "scale-down" | "contain" |
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Tool: references/images/configuration.md Description: # Configuration ## Wrangler Integration ### Workers Binding Setup Add to `wrangler.toml`: ```toml name = "my-image-worker" main = "src/index.ts" compatibility_date = "2024-01-01" [images] binding = "IMAGES" ``` Access in Worker: ```typescript interface Env { IMAGES: ImageBinding; } export default { async fetch(request: Request, env: Env): Promise<Response> { return await env.IMAGES .input(imageBuffer) .transform({ width: 800 }) .output() .res
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Tool: references/images/gotchas.md Description: # Gotchas & Best Practices ## Fit Modes | Mode | Best For | Behavior | |------|----------|----------| | `cover` | Hero images, thumbnails | Fills space, crops excess | | `contain` | Product images, artwork | Preserves full image, may add padding | | `scale-down` | User uploads | Never enlarges | | `crop` | Precise crops | Uses gravity | | `pad` | Fixed aspect ratio | Adds background | ## Format Selection ```typescript format: 'auto' // Recommended
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Tool: references/images/patterns.md Description: # Common Patterns ## URL Transform Options ``` width=<PX> height=<PX> fit=scale-down|contain|cover|crop|pad quality=85 format=auto|webp|avif|jpeg|png dpr=2 gravity=auto|face|left|right|top|bottom sharpen=2 blur=10 rotate=90|180|270 background=white metadata=none|copyright|keep ``` ## Responsive Images (srcset) ```html <img src="https://imagedelivery.net/{hash}/{id}/width=800" srcset=".../{id}/width=400 400w, .../{id}/width=800 800w
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Tool: references/kv/README.md Description: # Cloudflare Workers KV Globally-distributed, eventually-consistent key-value store optimized for high read volume and low latency.
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Tool: references/kv/api.md Description: # KV API Reference ## Read Operations ```typescript // Single key (string) const value = await env.MY_KV.get("user:123"); // JSON type (auto-parsed) const config = await env.MY_KV.get<AppConfig>("config", "json"); // ArrayBuffer for binary const buffer = await env.MY_KV.get("image", "arrayBuffer"); // Stream for large values const stream = await env.MY_KV.get("large-file", "stream"); // With cache TTL (min 60s) const value = await env.MY_KV.get("key", { ty
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Tool: references/kv/configuration.md Description: # KV Configuration ## Create Namespace ```bash wrangler kv namespace create MY_NAMESPACE # Output: { binding = "MY_NAMESPACE", id = "abc123..." } wrangler kv namespace create MY_NAMESPACE --preview # For local dev ``` ## Workers Binding **wrangler.jsonc:** ```jsonc { "kv_namespaces": [ { "binding": "MY_KV", "id": "abc123xyz789" }, // Optional: Different namespace for preview/development { "binding": "MY_KV", "preview_id": "preview-abc123" } ] }
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Tool: references/kv/gotchas.md Description: # KV Gotchas & Troubleshooting ## Common Errors ### "Stale Read After Write" **Cause:** Eventual consistency means writes may not be immediately visible in other regions **Solution:** Don't read immediately after write; return confirmation without reading or use the local value you just wrote.
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Tool: references/kv/patterns.md Description: # KV Patterns & Best Practices ## Multi-Tier Caching ```typescript // Memory → KV → Origin (3-tier cache) const memoryCache = new Map<string, { data: any; expires: number }>(); async function getCached(env: Env, key: string): Promise<any> { const now = Date.now(); // L1: Memory cache (fastest) const cached = memoryCache.get(key); if (cached && cached.expires > now) { return cached.data; } // L2: KV cache (fast) const kvValue = await env.CACHE.get(key,
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Tool: references/miniflare/README.md Description: # Miniflare Local simulator for Cloudflare Workers development/testing.
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Tool: references/miniflare/api.md Description: # Programmatic API ## Miniflare Class ```typescript class Miniflare { constructor(options: MiniflareOptions); // Lifecycle ready: Promise<URL>; // Resolves when server ready, returns URL dispose(): Promise<void>; // Cleanup resources setOptions(options: MiniflareOptions): Promise<void>; // Reload config // Event dispatching dispatchFetch(url: string | URL | Request, init?: RequestInit): Promise<Response>; getWorker(name?: string): Promise<Worker>; /
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Tool: references/miniflare/configuration.md Description: # Configuration ## Script Loading ```js // Inline new Miniflare({ modules: true, script: `export default { ...
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Tool: references/miniflare/gotchas.md Description: # Gotchas & Troubleshooting ## Miniflare Limitations **Not supported:** - Analytics Engine (use mocks) - Cloudflare Images/Stream - Browser Rendering API - Tail Workers - Workers for Platforms (partial support) **Behavior differences from production:** - Runs workerd locally, not Cloudflare edge - Storage is local (filesystem/memory), not distributed - `Request.cf` is cached/mocked, not real edge data - Performance differs from edge - Caching im
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Tool: references/miniflare/patterns.md Description: # Testing Patterns ## Choosing a Testing Approach | Approach | Use Case | Speed | Setup | Runtime | |----------|----------|-------|-------|---------| | **getPlatformProxy** | Unit tests, logic testing | Fast | Low | Miniflare | | **Miniflare API** | Integration tests, full control | Medium | Medium | Miniflare | | **vitest-pool-workers** | Vitest runner integration | Medium | Medium | workerd | **Quick guide:** - Unit tests → getPlatformProxy -
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Tool: references/network-interconnect/README.md Description: # Cloudflare Network Interconnect (CNI) Private, high-performance connectivity to Cloudflare's network.
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Tool: references/network-interconnect/api.md Description: # CNI API Reference See [README.md](README.md) for overview.
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Tool: references/network-interconnect/configuration.md Description: # CNI Configuration See [README.md](README.md) for overview. ## Workflow (2-4 weeks) 1.
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Tool: references/network-interconnect/gotchas.md Description: # CNI Gotchas & Troubleshooting ## Common Errors ### "Status: Pending" **Cause:** Cross-connect not installed, RX/TX fibers reversed, wrong fiber type, or low light levels **Solution:** 1. Verify cross-connect installed 2. Check fiber at patch panel 3.
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Tool: references/network-interconnect/patterns.md Description: # CNI Patterns See [README.md](README.md) for overview. ## High Availability **Critical:** Design for resilience from day one.
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Tool: references/observability/README.md Description: # Cloudflare Observability Skill Reference **Purpose**: Comprehensive guidance for implementing observability in Cloudflare Workers, covering traces, logs, metrics, and analytics.
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Tool: references/observability/api.md Description: ## API Reference ### GraphQL Analytics API **Endpoint**: `https://api.cloudflare.com/client/v4/graphql` **Query Workers Metrics**: ```graphql query { viewer { accounts(filter: { accountTag: $accountId }) { workersInvocationsAdaptive( limit: 100 filter: { datetime_geq: "2025-01-01T00:00:00Z" datetime_leq: "2025-01-31T23:59:59Z" scriptName: "my-worker" } ) { sum { requests errors subrequests } quantiles { cpuTimeP50 cpuTimeP99 wallTimeP50 wallTime
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Tool: references/observability/configuration.md Description: ## Configuration Patterns ### Enable Workers Logs ```jsonc { "observability": { "enabled": true, "head_sampling_rate": 1 // 100% sampling (default) } } ``` **Best Practice**: Use structured JSON logging for better indexing ```typescript // Good - structured logging console.log({ user_id: 123, action: "login", status: "success", duration_ms: 45 }); // Avoid - unstructured string console.log("user_id: 123 logged in successfully in 45ms"
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Tool: references/observability/gotchas.md Description: ## Common Errors ### "Logs not appearing" **Cause:** Observability disabled, Worker not redeployed, no traffic, low sampling rate, or log size exceeds 256 KB **Solution:** ```bash # Verify config cat wrangler.jsonc | jq '.observability' # Check deployment wrangler deployments list <WORKER_NAME> # Test with curl curl https://your-worker.workers.dev ``` Ensure `observability.enabled = true`, redeploy Worker, check `head_sampling_rate`, verify
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Tool: references/observability/patterns.md Description: # Observability Patterns ## Usage-Based Billing ```typescript env.ANALYTICS.writeDataPoint({ blobs: [customerId, request.url, request.method], doubles: [1], // request_count indexes: [customerId] }); ``` ```sql SELECT blob1 AS customer_id, SUM(_sample_interval * double1) AS total_calls FROM api_usage WHERE timestamp >= DATE_TRUNC('month', NOW()) GROUP BY customer_id ``` ## Performance Monitoring ```typescript const start = Date.now(); const
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Tool: references/pages-functions/README.md Description: # Cloudflare Pages Functions Serverless functions on Cloudflare Pages using Workers runtime.
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Tool: references/pages-functions/api.md Description: # Function API ## EventContext ```typescript interface EventContext<Env = any> { request: Request; // Incoming request functionPath: string; // Request path waitUntil(promise: Promise<any>): void; // Background tasks (non-blocking) passThroughOnException(): void; // Fallback to static on error next(input?: Request | string, init?: RequestInit): Promise<Response>; env: Env; // Bindings, vars,
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Tool: references/pages-functions/configuration.md Description: # Configuration ## TypeScript Setup **Generate types from wrangler.jsonc** (replaces deprecated `@cloudflare/workers-types`): ```bash npx wrangler types ``` Creates `worker-configuration.d.ts` with typed `Env` interface based on your bindings.
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Tool: references/pages-functions/gotchas.md Description: # Gotchas & Debugging ## Error Diagnosis | Symptom | Likely Cause | Solution | |---------|--------------|----------| | **Function not invoking** | Wrong `/functions` location, wrong extension, or `_routes.json` excludes path | Check `pages_build_output_dir`, use `.js`/`.ts`, verify `_routes.json` | | **`ctx.env.BINDING` undefined** | Binding not configured or name mismatch | Add to `wrangler.jsonc`, verify exact name (case-sensitive), rede
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Tool: references/pages-functions/patterns.md Description: # Common Patterns ## Background Tasks (waitUntil) Non-blocking tasks after response sent (analytics, cleanup, webhooks): ```typescript export async function onRequest(ctx: EventContext<Env>) { const res = Response.json({ success: true }); ctx.waitUntil(ctx.env.KV.put('last-visit', new Date().toISOString())); ctx.waitUntil(Promise.all([ ctx.env.ANALYTICS.writeDataPoint({ event: 'view' }), fetch('https://webhook.site/...', { method: 'POST'
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Tool: references/pages/README.md Description: # Cloudflare Pages JAMstack platform for full-stack apps on Cloudflare's global network.
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Tool: references/pages/api.md Description: # Functions API ## File-Based Routing ``` /functions/index.ts → example.com/ /functions/api/users.ts → example.com/api/users /functions/api/users/[id].ts → example.com/api/users/:id /functions/api/users/[[path]].ts → example.com/api/users/* (catchall) /functions/_middleware.ts → Runs before all routes ``` **Rules**: `[param]` = single segment, `[[param]]` = multi-segment catchall, more specific wins.
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Tool: references/pages/configuration.md Description: # Configuration ## wrangler.jsonc ```jsonc { "name": "my-pages-project", "pages_build_output_dir": "./dist", "compatibility_date": "2026-01-01", // Use current date for new projects "compatibility_flags": ["nodejs_compat"], "placement": { "mode": "smart" // Optional: Enable Smart Placement }, "kv_namespaces": [{"binding": "KV", "id": "abcd1234..."}], "d1_databases": [{"binding": "DB", "database_id": "xxxx-xxxx", "database_name": "production-d
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Tool: references/pages/gotchas.md Description: # Gotchas ## Functions Not Running **Problem**: Function endpoints return 404 or don't execute **Causes**: `_routes.json` excludes path; wrong file extension (`.jsx`/`.tsx`); Functions dir not at output root **Solution**: Check `_routes.json`, rename to `.ts`/`.js`, verify build output structure ## 404 on Static Assets **Problem**: Static files not serving **Causes**: Build output dir misconfigured; Functions catching requests; Advanced mode missing
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Tool: references/pages/patterns.md Description: # Patterns ## API Routes ```typescript // functions/api/todos/[id].ts export const onRequestGet: PagesFunction<Env> = async ({ env, params }) => { const todo = await env.DB.prepare('SELECT * FROM todos WHERE id = ?').bind(params.id).first(); if (!todo) return new Response('Not found', { status: 404 }); return Response.json(todo); }; export const onRequestPut: PagesFunction<Env> = async ({ env, params, request }) => { const body = await request.json
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Tool: references/pipelines/README.md Description: # Cloudflare Pipelines ETL streaming platform for ingesting, transforming, and loading data into R2 with SQL transformations.
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Tool: references/pipelines/api.md Description: # Pipelines API Reference ## Pipeline Binding Interface ```typescript // From @cloudflare/workers-types interface Pipeline { send(data: object | object[]): Promise<void>; } interface Env { STREAM: Pipeline; } export default { async fetch(request: Request, env: Env): Promise<Response> { // send() returns Promise<void> - no result data await env.STREAM.send([event]); return new Response('OK'); } } satisfies ExportedHandler<Env>; ``` **Key points:** -
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Tool: references/pipelines/configuration.md Description: # Pipelines Configuration ## Worker Binding ```jsonc // wrangler.jsonc { "pipelines": [ { "pipeline": "<STREAM_ID>", "binding": "STREAM" } ] } ``` Get stream ID: `npx wrangler pipelines streams list` ## Schema (Structured Streams) ```json { "fields": [ { "name": "user_id", "type": "string", "required": true }, { "name": "event_type", "type": "string", "required": true }, { "name": "amount", "type": "float64", "required": false }, { "name":
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Tool: references/pipelines/gotchas.md Description: # Pipelines Gotchas ## Critical Issues ### Events Silently Dropped **Most common issue.** Events accepted (HTTP 200) but never appear in sink.
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Tool: references/pipelines/patterns.md Description: # Pipelines Patterns ## Fire-and-Forget ```typescript export default { async fetch(request, env, ctx) { const event = { user_id: '...', event_type: 'page_view', timestamp: new Date().toISOString() }; ctx.waitUntil(env.STREAM.send([event])); // Don't block response return new Response('OK'); } }; ``` ## Schema Validation with Zod ```typescript import { z } from 'zod'; const EventSchema = z.object({ user_id: z.string(), event_type: z.enum(['purch
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Tool: references/pulumi/README.md Description: # Cloudflare Pulumi Provider Expert guidance for Cloudflare Pulumi Provider (@pulumi/cloudflare).
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Tool: references/pulumi/api.md Description: # API & Data Sources ## Outputs and Exports Export resource identifiers: ```typescript export const kvId = kv.id; export const bucketName = bucket.name; export const workerUrl = worker.subdomain; export const dbId = db.id; ``` ## Resource Dependencies Implicit dependencies via outputs: ```typescript const kv = new cloudflare.WorkersKvNamespace("kv", { accountId: accountId, title: "my-kv", }); // Worker depends on KV (implicit via kv.id) const worker =
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Tool: references/pulumi/configuration.md Description: # Resource Configuration ## Workers (cloudflare.WorkerScript) ```typescript import * as cloudflare from "@pulumi/cloudflare"; import * as fs from "fs"; const worker = new cloudflare.WorkerScript("my-worker", { accountId: accountId, name: "my-worker", content: fs.readFileSync("./dist/worker.js", "utf8"), module: true, // ES modules compatibilityDate: "2025-01-01", compatibilityFlags: ["nodejs_compat"], // v6.x: Observability logpush: true, //
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Tool: references/pulumi/gotchas.md Description: # Troubleshooting & Best Practices ## Common Errors ### "No bundler/build step" - Pulumi uploads raw code **Problem:** Worker fails with "Cannot use import statement outside a module" **Cause:** Pulumi doesn't bundle Worker code - uploads exactly what you provide **Solution:** Build Worker BEFORE Pulumi deploy ```typescript // WRONG: Pulumi won't bundle this const worker = new cloudflare.WorkerScript("worker", { content: fs.readFileSync("./src/inde
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Tool: references/pulumi/patterns.md Description: # Architecture Patterns ## Component Resources ```typescript class WorkerApp extends pulumi.ComponentResource { constructor(name: string, args: WorkerAppArgs, opts?) { super("custom:cloudflare:WorkerApp", name, {}, opts); const defaultOpts = {parent: this}; this.kv = new cloudflare.WorkersKvNamespace(`${name}-kv`, {accountId: args.accountId, title: `${name}-kv`}, defaultOpts); this.worker = new cloudflare.WorkerScript(`${name}-worker`, { accountId
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Tool: references/queues/README.md Description: # Cloudflare Queues Flexible message queuing for async task processing with guaranteed at-least-once delivery and configurable batching.
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Tool: references/queues/api.md Description: # Queues API Reference ## Producer: Send Messages ```typescript // Basic send await env.MY_QUEUE.send({ url: request.url, timestamp: Date.now() }); // Options: delay (max 43200s), contentType (json|text|bytes|v8) await env.MY_QUEUE.send(message, { delaySeconds: 600 }); await env.MY_QUEUE.send(message, { delaySeconds: 0 }); // Override queue default // Batch (up to 100 msgs or 256 KB) await env.MY_QUEUE.sendBatch([ { body: 'msg1' }, { body: 'msg2' }, {
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Tool: references/queues/configuration.md Description: # Queues Configuration ## Create Queue ```bash wrangler queues create my-queue wrangler queues create my-queue --retention-period-hours=336 # 14 days wrangler queues create my-queue --delivery-delay-secs=300 ``` ## Producer Binding **wrangler.jsonc:** ```jsonc { "queues": { "producers": [ { "queue": "my-queue-name", "binding": "MY_QUEUE", "delivery_delay": 60 // Optional: default delay in seconds } ] } } ``` ## Consumer Configuration (Push-
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Tool: references/queues/gotchas.md [1/2] Description: # Queues Gotchas & Troubleshooting ## CRITICAL: Top Production Mistakes ### 1.
Tool: references/queues/gotchas.md [2/2]
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Tool: references/queues/patterns.md Description: # Queues Patterns & Best Practices ## Async Task Processing ```typescript // Producer: Accept request, queue work export default { async fetch(request: Request, env: Env): Promise<Response> { const { userId, reportType } = await request.json(); await env.REPORT_QUEUE.send({ userId, reportType, requestedAt: Date.now() }); return Response.json({ message: 'Report queued', status: 'pending' }); } }; // Consumer: Process reports export default { async
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Tool: references/r2-data-catalog/README.md Description: # Cloudflare R2 Data Catalog Skill Reference Expert guidance for Cloudflare R2 Data Catalog - Apache Iceberg catalog built into R2 buckets.
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Tool: references/r2-data-catalog/api.md Description: # API Reference R2 Data Catalog exposes standard [Apache Iceberg REST Catalog API](https://github.com/apache/iceberg/blob/main/open-api/rest-catalog-open-api.yaml).
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Tool: references/r2-data-catalog/configuration.md Description: # Configuration How to enable R2 Data Catalog and configure authentication.
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Tool: references/r2-data-catalog/gotchas.md Description: # Gotchas & Troubleshooting Common problems → causes → solutions. ## Permission Errors ### 401 Unauthorized **Error:** `"401 Unauthorized"` **Cause:** Token missing R2 Data Catalog permissions. **Solution:** Use "Admin Read & Write" token (includes catalog + storage permissions). Test with `catalog.list_namespaces()`. ### 403 Forbidden **Error:** `"403 Forbidden"` on data files **Cause:** Token lacks storage permissions.
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Tool: references/r2-data-catalog/patterns.md Description: # Common Patterns Practical patterns for R2 Data Catalog with PyIceberg.
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Tool: references/r2-sql/README.md Description: # Cloudflare R2 SQL Skill Reference Expert guidance for Cloudflare R2 SQL - serverless distributed query engine for Apache Iceberg tables.
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Tool: references/r2-sql/api.md Description: # R2 SQL API Reference SQL syntax, functions, operators, and data types for R2 SQL queries.
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Tool: references/r2-sql/configuration.md Description: # R2 SQL Configuration Setup and configuration for R2 SQL queries. ## Prerequisites - R2 bucket with Data Catalog enabled - API token with R2 permissions - Wrangler CLI installed (for CLI queries) ## Enable R2 Data Catalog R2 SQL queries Apache Iceberg tables in R2 Data Catalog.
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Tool: references/r2-sql/gotchas.md Description: # R2 SQL Gotchas Limitations, troubleshooting, and common pitfalls for R2 SQL.
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Tool: references/r2-sql/patterns.md Description: # R2 SQL Patterns Common patterns, use cases, and integration examples for R2 SQL.
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Tool: references/r2/README.md Description: # Cloudflare R2 Object Storage S3-compatible object storage with zero egress fees, optimized for large file storage and delivery.
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Tool: references/r2/api.md Description: # R2 API Reference ## PUT (Upload) ```typescript // Basic await env.MY_BUCKET.put(key, value); // With metadata await env.MY_BUCKET.put(key, value, { httpMetadata: { contentType: 'image/jpeg', contentDisposition: 'attachment; filename="photo.jpg"', cacheControl: 'max-age=3600' }, customMetadata: { userId: '123', version: '2' }, storageClass: 'Standard', // or 'InfrequentAccess' sha256: arrayBufferOrHex, // Integrity check ssecKey: arrayBuffer32bytes // SSE
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Tool: references/r2/configuration.md Description: # R2 Configuration ## Workers Binding **wrangler.jsonc:** ```jsonc { "r2_buckets": [ { "binding": "MY_BUCKET", "bucket_name": "my-bucket-name" } ] } ``` ## TypeScript Types ```typescript interface Env { MY_BUCKET: R2Bucket; } export default { async fetch(request: Request, env: Env): Promise<Response> { const object = await env.MY_BUCKET.get('file.txt'); return new Response(object?.body); } } ``` ## S3 SDK Setup ```typescript import { S3Client, Pu
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Tool: references/r2/gotchas.md Description: # R2 Gotchas & Troubleshooting ## List Truncation ```typescript // ❌ WRONG: Don't compare object count when using include while (listed.objects.length < options.limit) { ...
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Tool: references/r2/patterns.md Description: # R2 Patterns & Best Practices ## Streaming Large Files ```typescript const object = await env.MY_BUCKET.get(key); if (!object) return new Response('Not found', { status: 404 }); const headers = new Headers(); object.writeHttpMetadata(headers); headers.set('etag', object.httpEtag); return new Response(object.body, { headers }); ``` ## Conditional GET (304 Not Modified) ```typescript const ifNoneMatch = request.headers.get('if-none-match'); const objec
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Tool: references/realtime-sfu/README.md Description: # Cloudflare Realtime SFU Reference Expert guidance for building real-time audio/video/data applications using Cloudflare Realtime SFU (Selective Forwarding Unit).
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Tool: references/realtime-sfu/api.md Description: # API Reference ## Authentication ```bash curl -X POST 'https://rtc.live/v1/apps/${CALLS_APP_ID}/sessions/new' \ -H "Authorization: Bearer ${CALLS_APP_SECRET}" ``` ## Core Concepts **Sessions:** PeerConnection to Cloudflare edge **Tracks:** Media/data channels (audio/video/datachannel) **No rooms:** Build presence via track sharing ## Client Libraries **PartyTracks (Recommended):** Observable-based client library for production use.
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Tool: references/realtime-sfu/configuration.md Description: # Configuration & Deployment ## Dashboard Setup 1.
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Tool: references/realtime-sfu/gotchas.md Description: # Gotchas & Troubleshooting ## Common Errors ### "Slow initial connect (~1.8s)" **Cause:** First STUN delayed during consensus forming (normal behavior) **Solution:** Subsequent connections are faster. CF detects DTLS ClientHello early to compensate.
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Tool: references/realtime-sfu/patterns.md Description: # Patterns & Use Cases ## Architecture ``` Client (WebRTC) <---> CF Edge <---> Backend (HTTP) | CF Backbone (310+ DCs) | Other Edges <---> Other Clients ``` Anycast: Last-mile <50ms (95%), no region select, NACK shield, distributed consensus Cascading trees auto-scale to millions: ``` Publisher -> Edge A -> Edge B -> Sub1 \-> Edge C -> Sub2,3 ``` ## Use Cases **1:1:** A creates session+publishes, B creates+subscribes to A+publishes, A subscr
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Tool: references/realtimekit/README.md Description: # Cloudflare RealtimeKit Expert guidance for building real-time video and audio applications using **Cloudflare RealtimeKit** - a comprehensive SDK suite for adding customizable live video and voice to web or mobile applications.
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Tool: references/realtimekit/api.md Description: # RealtimeKit API Reference Complete API reference for Meeting object, REST endpoints, and SDK methods.
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Tool: references/realtimekit/configuration.md Description: # RealtimeKit Configuration Configuration guide for RealtimeKit setup, client SDKs, and wrangler integration.
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Tool: references/realtimekit/gotchas.md Description: # RealtimeKit Gotchas & Troubleshooting ## Common Errors ### "Cannot connect to meeting" **Cause:** Auth token invalid/expired, API credentials lack permissions, or network blocks WebRTC **Solution:** Verify token validity, check API token has **Realtime / Realtime Admin** permissions, enable TURN service for restrictive networks ### "No video/audio tracks" **Cause:** Browser permissions not granted, video/audio not enabled, device in use, or
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Tool: references/realtimekit/patterns.md Description: # RealtimeKit Patterns ## UI Kit (Minimal Code) ```tsx // React import { RtkMeeting } from '@cloudflare/realtimekit-react-ui'; <RtkMeeting authToken="<token>" onLeave={() => console.log('Left')} /> // Angular @Component({ template: `<rtk-meeting [authToken]="authToken" (rtkLeave)="onLeave($event)"></rtk-meeting>` }) export class AppComponent { authToken = '<token>'; onLeave(event: unknown) {} } // HTML/Web Components <script type="module" src
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Tool: references/sandbox/README.md Description: # Cloudflare Sandbox SDK Secure isolated code execution in containers on Cloudflare's edge.
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Tool: references/sandbox/api.md Description: # API Reference ## Command Execution ```typescript // Basic const result = await sandbox.exec('python3 script.py'); // Returns: { stdout, stderr, exitCode, success, duration } // With options await sandbox.exec('python3 test.py', { cwd: '/workspace/project', env: { API_KEY: 'secret' }, stream: true, onOutput: (stream, data) => console.log(data) }); ``` ## File Operations ```typescript // Read/Write const { content } = await sandbox.readFile('/workspac
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Tool: references/sandbox/configuration.md Description: # Configuration ## getSandbox Options ```typescript const sandbox = getSandbox(env.Sandbox, 'sandbox-id', { normalizeId: true, // lowercase ID (required for preview URLs) sleepAfter: '10m', // sleep after inactivity: '5m', '1h', '2d' (default: '10m') keepAlive: false, // false = auto-timeout, true = never sleep containerTimeouts: { instanceGetTimeoutMS: 30000, // 30s for provisioning (default: 30000) portReadyTimeou
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Tool: references/sandbox/gotchas.md Description: # Gotchas & Best Practices ## Common Errors ### "Container running indefinitely" **Cause:** `keepAlive: true` without calling `destroy()` **Solution:** Always call `destroy()` when done with keepAlive containers ```typescript const sandbox = getSandbox(env.Sandbox, 'temp', { keepAlive: true }); try { const result = await sandbox.exec('python script.py'); return result.stdout; } finally { await sandbox.destroy(); // REQUIRED to free resources } ``
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Tool: references/sandbox/patterns.md Description: # Common Patterns ## AI Code Execution with Code Context ```typescript export default { async fetch(request: Request, env: Env): Promise<Response> { const { code, variables } = await request.json(); const sandbox = getSandbox(env.Sandbox, 'ai-agent'); // Create context with persistent variables const ctx = await sandbox.createCodeContext({ language: 'python', variables: variables || {} }); // Execute with rich outputs (text, images, HTML) const r
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Tool: references/secrets-store/README.md Description: # Cloudflare Secrets Store Account-level encrypted secret management for Workers and AI Gateway.
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Tool: references/secrets-store/api.md Description: # API Reference ## Binding API ### Basic Access **CRITICAL**: Async `.get()` required - secrets NOT directly available.
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Tool: references/secrets-store/configuration.md Description: # Configuration ## Wrangler Config ### Basic Binding **wrangler.jsonc**: ```jsonc { "secrets_store_secrets": [ { "binding": "API_KEY", "store_id": "abc123", "secret_name": "stripe_api_key" } ] } ``` **wrangler.toml** (alternative): ```toml [[secrets_store_secrets]] binding = "API_KEY" store_id = "abc123" secret_name = "stripe_api_key" ``` Fields: - `binding`: Variable name for `env` access - `store_id`: From `wrangler secrets-store sto
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Tool: references/secrets-store/gotchas.md Description: # Gotchas ## Common Errors ### ".get() Throws on Error" **Cause:** Assuming `.get()` returns null on failure instead of throwing **Solution:** Always wrap `.get()` calls in try/catch blocks to handle errors gracefully ```typescript try { const key = await env.API_KEY.get(); } catch (error) { return new Response("Configuration error", { status: 500 }); } ``` ### "Logging Secret Values" **Cause:** Accidentally logging secret values in console
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Tool: references/secrets-store/patterns.md Description: # Patterns ## Secret Rotation Zero-downtime rotation with versioned naming (`api_key_v1`, `api_key_v2`): ```typescript interface Env { PRIMARY_KEY: { get(): Promise<string> }; FALLBACK_KEY?: { get(): Promise<string> }; } async function fetchWithAuth(url: string, key: string) { return fetch(url, { headers: { "Authorization": `Bearer ${key}` } }); } export default { async fetch(request: Request, env: Env): Promise<Response> { let resp = await
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Tool: references/smart-placement/README.md Description: # Cloudflare Workers Smart Placement Automatic workload placement optimization to minimize latency by running Workers closer to backend infrastructure rather than end users.
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Tool: references/smart-placement/api.md Description: # Smart Placement API ## Placement Status API Query Worker placement status via Cloudflare API: ```bash curl -X GET "https://api.cloudflare.com/client/v4/accounts/{ACCOUNT_ID}/workers/services/{WORKER_NAME}" \ -H "Authorization: Bearer <TOKEN>" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" ``` Response includes `placement_status` field: ```typescript type PlacementStatus = | undefined // Not yet analyzed | 'SUCCESS' // Successfully optimized | 'INSU
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Tool: references/smart-placement/configuration.md Description: # Smart Placement Configuration ## wrangler.jsonc Setup ```jsonc { "$schema": "./node_modules/wrangler/config-schema.json", "placement": { "mode": "smart" } } ``` ## Placement Mode Values | Mode | Behavior | |------|----------| | `"smart"` | Enable Smart Placement - automatic optimization based on traffic analysis | | `"off"` | Explicitly disable Smart Placement - always run at edge closest to user | | Not specified | Default behavio
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Tool: references/smart-placement/gotchas.md Description: # Smart Placement Gotchas ## Common Errors ### "INSUFFICIENT_INVOCATIONS" **Cause:** Not enough traffic for Smart Placement to analyze **Solution:** - Ensure Worker receives consistent global traffic - Wait longer (analysis takes up to 15 minutes) - Send test traffic from multiple global locations - Check Worker has fetch event handler ### "UNSUPPORTED_APPLICATION" **Cause:** Smart Placement made Worker slower rather than faster **Reasons:
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Tool: references/smart-placement/patterns.md Description: # Smart Placement Patterns ## Backend Worker with Database Access ```typescript export default { async fetch(request: Request, env: Env): Promise<Response> { const user = await env.DATABASE.prepare('SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = ?').bind(userId).first(); const orders = await env.DATABASE.prepare('SELECT * FROM orders WHERE user_id = ?').bind(userId).all(); return Response.json({ user, orders }); } }; ``` ```jsonc { "placement": { "mode":
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Tool: references/snippets/README.md Description: # Cloudflare Snippets Skill Reference ## Description Expert guidance for **Cloudflare Snippets ONLY** - a lightweight JavaScript-based edge logic platform for modifying HTTP requests and responses.
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Tool: references/snippets/api.md Description: # Snippets API Reference ## Request Object ### HTTP Properties ```javascript request.method // GET, POST, PUT, DELETE, etc.
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Tool: references/snippets/configuration.md Description: # Snippets Configuration Guide ## Configuration Methods ### 1.
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Tool: references/snippets/gotchas.md Description: # Gotchas & Best Practices ## Common Errors ### 1000: "Snippet execution failed" Runtime error or syntax error.
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Tool: references/snippets/patterns.md Description: # Snippets Patterns ## Security Headers ```javascript export default { async fetch(request) { const response = await fetch(request); const newResponse = new Response(response.body, response); newResponse.headers.set("X-Frame-Options", "DENY"); newResponse.headers.set("X-Content-Type-Options", "nosniff"); newResponse.headers.delete("X-Powered-By"); return newResponse; } } ``` **Rule:** `true` (all requests) ## Geo-Based Routing ```javascript expo
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Tool: references/spectrum/README.md Description: # Cloudflare Spectrum Skill Reference ## Overview Cloudflare Spectrum provides security and acceleration for ANY TCP or UDP-based application.
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Tool: references/spectrum/api.md Description: ## REST API Endpoints ``` GET /zones/{zone_id}/spectrum/apps # List apps POST /zones/{zone_id}/spectrum/apps # Create app GET /zones/{zone_id}/spectrum/apps/{app_id} # Get app PUT /zones/{zone_id}/spectrum/apps/{app_id} # Update app DELETE /zones/{zone_id}/spectrum/apps/{app_id} # Delete app GET /zones/{zone_id}/spectrum/analytics/aggregate/current GET /zones/{zone_i
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Tool: references/spectrum/configuration.md Description: ## Origin Types ### Direct IP Origin Use when origin is a single server with static IP.
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Tool: references/spectrum/gotchas.md Description: ## Common Issues ### Connection Timeouts **Problem:** Connections fail or timeout **Cause:** Origin firewall blocking Cloudflare IPs, origin service not running, incorrect DNS **Solution:** 1.
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Tool: references/spectrum/patterns.md Description: ## Common Use Cases ### 1.
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Tool: references/static-assets/README.md Description: # Cloudflare Static Assets Skill Reference Expert guidance for deploying and configuring static assets with Cloudflare Workers.
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Tool: references/static-assets/api.md Description: # API Reference ## ASSETS Binding The `ASSETS` binding provides access to static assets via the `Fetcher` interface.
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Tool: references/static-assets/configuration.md Description: ## Configuration ### Basic Setup Minimal configuration requires only `assets.directory`: ```jsonc { "name": "my-worker", "compatibility_date": "2025-01-01", // Use current date for new projects "assets": { "directory": "./dist" } } ``` ### Full Configuration Options ```jsonc { "name": "my-worker", "main": "src/index.ts", "compatibility_date": "2025-01-01", "assets": { "directory": "./dist", "binding": "ASSETS", "not_found_handling": "
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Tool: references/static-assets/gotchas.md Description: ## Best Practices ### 1.
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Tool: references/static-assets/patterns.md Description: ### Common Patterns **1.
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Tool: references/stream/README.md Description: # Cloudflare Stream Serverless live and on-demand video streaming platform with one API.
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Tool: references/stream/api-live.md Description: # Stream Live Streaming API Live input creation, status checking, simulcast, and WebRTC streaming.
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Tool: references/stream/api.md Description: # Stream API Reference Upload, playback, live streaming, and management APIs.
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Tool: references/stream/configuration.md Description: # Stream Configuration Setup, environment variables, and wrangler configuration.
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Tool: references/stream/gotchas.md Description: # Stream Gotchas ## Common Errors ### "ERR_NON_VIDEO" **Cause:** Uploaded file is not a valid video format **Solution:** Ensure file is in supported format (MP4, MKV, MOV, AVI, FLV, MPEG-2 TS/PS, MXF, LXF, GXF, 3GP, WebM, MPG, QuickTime) ### "ERR_DURATION_EXCEED_CONSTRAINT" **Cause:** Video duration exceeds `maxDurationSeconds` constraint **Solution:** Increase `maxDurationSeconds` in direct upload config or trim video before upload ### "ERR_FETCH_
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Tool: references/stream/patterns.md Description: # Stream Patterns Common workflows, full-stack flows, and best practices.
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Tool: references/tail-workers/README.md Description: # Cloudflare Tail Workers Specialized Workers that consume execution events from producer Workers for logging, debugging, analytics, and observability.
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Tool: references/tail-workers/api.md Description: # Tail Workers API Reference ## Handler Signature ```typescript export default { async tail( events: TraceItem[], env: Env, ctx: ExecutionContext ): Promise<void> { // Process events } } satisfies ExportedHandler<Env>; ``` **Parameters:** - `events`: Array of `TraceItem` objects (one per producer invocation) - `env`: Bindings (KV, D1, R2, env vars, etc.) - `ctx`: Context with `waitUntil()` for async work **CRITICAL:** Tail handlers don't return v
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Tool: references/tail-workers/configuration.md Description: # Tail Workers Configuration ## Setup Steps ### 1.
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Tool: references/tail-workers/gotchas.md Description: # Tail Workers Gotchas & Debugging ## Critical Pitfalls ### 1.
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Tool: references/tail-workers/patterns.md Description: # Tail Workers Common Patterns ## Community Libraries While most tail Worker implementations are custom, these libraries may help: **Logging/Observability:** - **Axiom** - `axiom-cloudflare-workers` (npm) - Direct Axiom integration - **Baselime** - SDK for Baselime observability platform - **LogFlare** - Structured log aggregation **Type Definitions:** - **@cloudflare/workers-types** - Official TypeScript types (use `TraceItem`) **Note:** Mo
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Tool: references/terraform/README.md Description: # Cloudflare Terraform Provider **Expert guidance for Cloudflare Terraform Provider - infrastructure as code for Cloudflare resources.** ## Core Principles - **Provider-first**: Use Terraform provider for ALL infrastructure - never mix with wrangler.jsonc for the same resources - **State management**: Always use remote state (S3, Terraform Cloud, etc.) for team environments - **Modular architecture**: Create reusable modules for common patterns (
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Tool: references/terraform/api.md Description: # Terraform Data Sources Reference Query existing Cloudflare resources to reference in your configurations.
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Tool: references/terraform/configuration.md Description: # Terraform Configuration Reference Complete resource configurations for Cloudflare infrastructure.
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Tool: references/terraform/gotchas.md Description: # Terraform Troubleshooting & Best Practices Common issues, security considerations, and best practices.
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Tool: references/terraform/patterns.md Description: # Terraform Patterns & Use Cases Architecture patterns, multi-environment setups, and real-world use cases.
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Tool: references/tunnel/README.md Description: # Cloudflare Tunnel Secure outbound-only connections between infrastructure and Cloudflare's global network.
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Tool: references/tunnel/api.md Description: # Tunnel API ## Cloudflare API Access **Base URL**: `https://api.cloudflare.com/client/v4` **Authentication**: ```bash Authorization: Bearer ${CF_API_TOKEN} ``` ## TypeScript SDK Install: `npm install cloudflare` ```typescript import Cloudflare from 'cloudflare'; const cf = new Cloudflare({ apiToken: process.env.CF_API_TOKEN, }); const accountId = process.env.CF_ACCOUNT_ID; ``` ## Create Tunnel ### cURL ```bash curl -X POST "https://api.cloudflare.com/
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Tool: references/tunnel/configuration.md Description: # Tunnel Configuration ## Config Source Tunnels use one of two config sources: | Config Source | Storage | Updates | Use Case | |---------------|---------|---------|----------| | Local | `config.yml` file | Edit file, restart | Dev, multi-env, version control | | Cloudflare | Dashboard/API | Instant, no restart | Production, centralized management | **Token-based tunnels** = config source: Cloudflare **Locally-managed tunnels** = config sourc
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Tool: references/tunnel/gotchas.md Description: # Tunnel Gotchas ## Common Errors ### "Error 1016 (Origin DNS Error)" **Cause:** Tunnel not running or not connected **Solution:** ```bash cloudflared tunnel info my-tunnel # Check status ps aux | grep cloudflared # Verify running journalctl -u cloudflared -n 100 # Check logs ``` ### "Self-signed certificate rejected" **Cause:** Origin using self-signed certificate **Solution:** ```yaml originRequest: noTLSVerify: true # D
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Tool: references/tunnel/networking.md Description: # Tunnel Networking ## Connectivity Requirements ### Outbound Ports Cloudflared requires outbound access on: | Port | Protocol | Purpose | Required | |------|----------|---------|----------| | 7844 | TCP/UDP | Primary tunnel protocol (QUIC) | Yes | | 443 | TCP | Fallback (HTTP/2) | Yes | **Network path:** ``` cloudflared → edge.argotunnel.com:7844 (preferred) cloudflared → region.argotunnel.com:443 (fallback) ``` ### Firewall Rules #### Minimal
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Tool: references/tunnel/patterns.md Description: # Tunnel Patterns ## Docker Deployment ### Token-Based (Recommended) ```yaml services: cloudflared: image: cloudflare/cloudflared:latest command: tunnel --no-autoupdate run --token ${TUNNEL_TOKEN} restart: unless-stopped ``` ### Local Config ```yaml services: cloudflared: image: cloudflare/cloudflared:latest volumes: - ./config.yml:/etc/cloudflared/config.yml:ro - ./credentials.json:/etc/cloudflared/credentials.json:ro command: tunnel run ``` ## K
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Tool: references/turn/README.md Description: # Cloudflare TURN Service Expert guidance for implementing Cloudflare TURN Service in WebRTC applications.
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Tool: references/turn/api.md Description: # TURN API Reference Complete API documentation for Cloudflare TURN service credentials and key management.
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Tool: references/turn/configuration.md Description: # TURN Configuration Setup and configuration for Cloudflare TURN service in Workers and applications.
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Tool: references/turn/gotchas.md Description: # TURN Gotchas & Troubleshooting Common mistakes, security best practices, and troubleshooting for Cloudflare TURN.
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Tool: references/turn/patterns.md Description: # TURN Implementation Patterns Production-ready patterns for implementing Cloudflare TURN in WebRTC applications.
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Tool: references/turnstile/README.md Description: # Cloudflare Turnstile Implementation Skill Reference Expert guidance for implementing Cloudflare Turnstile - a smart CAPTCHA alternative that protects websites from bots without showing traditional CAPTCHA puzzles.
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Tool: references/turnstile/api.md Description: # API Reference ## Client-Side JavaScript API The Turnstile JavaScript API is available at `window.turnstile` after loading the script.
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Tool: references/turnstile/configuration.md Description: # Configuration ## Script Loading ### Basic (Implicit Rendering) ```html <script src="https://challenges.cloudflare.com/turnstile/v0/api.js" async defer></script> ``` Automatically renders widgets with `class="cf-turnstile"` on page load.
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Tool: references/turnstile/gotchas.md Description: # Troubleshooting & Gotchas ## Critical Rules ### ❌ Skipping Server-Side Validation **Problem:** Client-only validation is easily bypassed. **Solution:** Always validate on server.
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Tool: references/turnstile/patterns.md Description: # Common Patterns ## Form Integration ### Basic Form (Implicit Rendering) ```html <!DOCTYPE html> <html> <head> <script src="https://challenges.cloudflare.com/turnstile/v0/api.js" async defer></script> </head> <body> <form action="/submit" method="POST"> <input type="email" name="email" required> <div class="cf-turnstile" data-sitekey="YOUR_SITE_KEY"></div> <button type="submit">Submit</button> </form> </body> </html> ``` ### Controlled Form (E
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Tool: references/vectorize/README.md Description: # Cloudflare Vectorize Globally distributed vector database for AI applications.
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Tool: references/vectorize/api.md Description: # Vectorize API Reference ## Types ```typescript interface VectorizeVector { id: string; // Max 64 bytes values: number[]; // Must match index dimensions namespace?: string; // Optional partition (max 64 bytes) metadata?: Record<string, any>; // Max 10 KiB } ``` ## Query ```typescript const matches = await env.VECTORIZE.query(queryVector, { topK: 10, // Max 100 (or 20 with returnValue
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Tool: references/vectorize/configuration.md Description: # Vectorize Configuration ## Create Index ```bash npx wrangler vectorize create my-index --dimensions=768 --metric=cosine ``` **⚠️ Dimensions and metric are immutable** - cannot change after creation.
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Tool: references/vectorize/gotchas.md Description: # Vectorize Gotchas ## Critical Warnings ### Async Mutations Insert/upsert/delete return immediately but vectors aren't queryable for 5-10 seconds.
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Tool: references/vectorize/patterns.md Description: # Vectorize Patterns ## Workers AI Integration ```typescript // Generate embedding + query const result = await env.AI.run("@cf/baai/bge-base-en-v1.5", { text: [query] }); const matches = await env.VECTORIZE.query(result.data[0], { topK: 5 }); // Pass data[0]!
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Tool: references/waf/README.md Description: # Cloudflare WAF Expert Skill Reference **Expertise**: Cloudflare Web Application Firewall (WAF) configuration, custom rules, managed rulesets, rate limiting, attack detection, and API integration ## Overview Cloudflare WAF protects web applications from attacks through managed rulesets and custom rules.
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Tool: references/waf/api.md Description: # API Reference ## SDK Setup ```typescript import Cloudflare from 'cloudflare'; const client = new Cloudflare({ apiToken: process.env.CF_API_TOKEN, }); ``` ## Core Methods ```typescript // List rulesets await client.rulesets.list({ zone_id: 'zone_id', phase: 'http_request_firewall_managed' }); // Get ruleset await client.rulesets.get({ zone_id: 'zone_id', ruleset_id: 'ruleset_id' }); // Create ruleset await client.rulesets.create({ zone_id: 'zone_id', kin
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Tool: references/waf/configuration.md Description: # Configuration ## Prerequisites **API Token**: Create at https://dash.cloudflare.com/profile/api-tokens - Permission: `Zone.WAF Edit` or `Zone.Firewall Services Edit` - Zone Resources: Include specific zones or all zones **Zone ID**: Found in dashboard > Overview > API section (right sidebar) ```bash # Set environment variables export CF_API_TOKEN="your_api_token_here" export ZONE_ID="your_zone_id_here" ``` ## TypeScript SDK Usage ```bash npm i
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Tool: references/waf/gotchas.md Description: # Gotchas & Troubleshooting ## Execution Order **Problem:** Rules execute in unexpected order **Cause:** Misunderstanding phase execution **Solution:** Phases execute sequentially (can't be changed): 1.
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Tool: references/waf/patterns.md Description: # Common Patterns ## Deploy Managed Rulesets ```typescript // Deploy Cloudflare Managed Ruleset (default) await client.rulesets.create({ zone_id: 'zone_id', kind: 'zone', phase: 'http_request_firewall_managed', name: 'Cloudflare Managed Ruleset', rules: [{ action: 'execute', action_parameters: { id: 'efb7b8c949ac4650a09736fc376e9aee', // Cloudflare Managed // Or: '4814384a9e5d4991b9815dcfc25d2f1f' for OWASP CRS // Or: 'c2e184081120413c86c3ab7e1406960
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Tool: references/web-analytics/README.md Description: # Cloudflare Web Analytics Privacy-first web analytics providing Core Web Vitals, traffic metrics, and user insights without compromising visitor privacy.
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Tool: references/web-analytics/configuration.md Description: # Configuration ## Setup Methods ### Proxied Sites (Automatic) Dashboard → Web Analytics → Add site → Select hostname → Done | Injection Option | Description | |------------------|-------------| | Enable | Auto-inject for all visitors (default) | | Enable, excluding EU | No injection for EU (GDPR) | | Enable with manual snippet | You add beacon manually | | Disable | Pause tracking | **Fails if response has:** `Cache-Control: public, n
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Tool: references/web-analytics/gotchas.md Description: # Web Analytics Gotchas ## Critical Issues ### SPA Navigation Not Tracked **Symptom:** Only initial pageload counted **Fix:** Add `spa: true`: ```html <script data-cf-beacon='{"token": "TOKEN", "spa": true}' ...></script> ``` ### CSP Blocking Beacon **Symptom:** Console error "Refused to load script" **Fix:** Allow both domains: ``` script-src 'self' https://static.cloudflareinsights.com https://cloudflareinsights.com; ``` ### Hash-Based Rou
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Tool: references/web-analytics/integration.md Description: # Framework Integration **Web Analytics is dashboard-only** - no programmatic API.
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Tool: references/web-analytics/patterns.md Description: # Web Analytics Patterns ## Core Web Vitals Debugging Dashboard → Core Web Vitals → Click metric → Debug View shows top 5 problematic elements.
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Tool: references/workerd/README.md Description: # Workerd Runtime V8-based JS/Wasm runtime powering Cloudflare Workers.
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Tool: references/workerd/api.md Description: # Workerd APIs ## Worker Code (JS/TS) ### ES Modules (Recommended) ```javascript export default { async fetch(request, env, ctx) { const value = await env.KV.get("key"); // Bindings in env const response = await env.API.fetch(request); // Service binding ctx.waitUntil(logRequest(request)); // Background task return new Response("OK"); }, async adminApi(request, env, ctx) { /* Named entrypoint */ }, async queue(batch, env, ctx)
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Tool: references/workerd/configuration.md Description: # Workerd Configuration ## Basic Structure ```capnp using Workerd = import "/workerd/workerd.capnp"; const config :Workerd.Config = ( services = [(name = "main", worker = .mainWorker)], sockets = [(name = "http", address = "*:8080", http = (), service = "main")] ); const mainWorker :Workerd.Worker = ( modules = [(name = "index.js", esModule = embed "src/index.js")], compatibilityDate = "2024-01-15", bindings = [...] ); ``` ## Services **Work
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Tool: references/workerd/gotchas.md Description: # Workerd Gotchas ## Common Errors ### "Missing compatibility date" **Cause:** Compatibility date not set **Solution:** ❌ Wrong: ```capnp const worker :Workerd.Worker = ( serviceWorkerScript = embed "worker.js" ) ``` ✅ Correct: ```capnp const worker :Workerd.Worker = ( serviceWorkerScript = embed "worker.js", compatibilityDate = "2024-01-15" # Always set!
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Tool: references/workerd/patterns.md Description: # Workerd Patterns ## Multi-Service Architecture ```capnp const config :Workerd.Config = ( services = [ (name = "frontend", worker = ( modules = [(name = "index.js", esModule = embed "frontend/index.js")], compatibilityDate = "2024-01-15", bindings = [(name = "API", service = "api")] )), (name = "api", worker = ( modules = [(name = "index.js", esModule = embed "api/index.js")], compatibilityDate = "2024-01-15", bindings = [(name = "DB", service =
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Tool: references/workers-ai/README.md Description: # Cloudflare Workers AI Expert guidance for Cloudflare Workers AI - serverless GPU-powered AI inference at the edge.
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Tool: references/workers-ai/api.md Description: # Workers AI API Reference ## Core Method ```typescript const response = await env.AI.run(model, input); ``` ## Text Generation ```typescript const result = await env.AI.run('@cf/meta/llama-3.1-8b-instruct', { messages: [ { role: 'system', content: 'You are helpful' }, { role: 'user', content: 'Hello' } ], temperature: 0.7, // 0-1 max_tokens: 100 }); console.log(result.response); ``` **Streaming:** ```typescript const stream = await env.AI.run(mod
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Tool: references/workers-ai/configuration.md Description: # Workers AI Configuration ## wrangler.jsonc ```jsonc { "name": "my-ai-worker", "main": "src/index.ts", "compatibility_date": "2024-01-01", "ai": { "binding": "AI" } } ``` ## TypeScript ```bash npm install --save-dev @cloudflare/workers-types ``` ```typescript interface Env { AI: Ai; } export default { async fetch(request: Request, env: Env) { const response = await env.AI.run('@cf/meta/llama-3.1-8b-instruct', { messages: [{ role: 'user',
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Tool: references/workers-ai/gotchas.md Description: # Workers AI Gotchas ## Critical: @cloudflare/ai is DEPRECATED ```typescript // ❌ WRONG - Don't install @cloudflare/ai import Ai from '@cloudflare/ai'; // ✅ CORRECT - Use native binding export default { async fetch(request: Request, env: Env) { await env.AI.run('@cf/meta/llama-3.1-8b-instruct', { messages: [...] }); } } ``` ## Development ### "AI inference doesn't work locally" ```bash # ❌ Local AI doesn't work wrangler dev # ✅ Use remote wrang
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Tool: references/workers-ai/patterns.md Description: # Workers AI Patterns ## RAG (Retrieval-Augmented Generation) ```typescript // 1.
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Tool: references/workers-for-platforms/README.md Description: # Cloudflare Workers for Platforms Multi-tenant platform with isolated customer code execution at scale.
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Tool: references/workers-for-platforms/api.md Description: # API Operations ## Deploy User Worker ```bash curl -X PUT \ "https://api.cloudflare.com/client/v4/accounts/$ACCOUNT_ID/workers/dispatch/namespaces/$NAMESPACE/scripts/$SCRIPT_NAME" \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $API_TOKEN" \ -F 'metadata={"main_module": "worker.mjs"};type=application/json' \ -F 'worker.mjs=@worker.mjs;type=application/javascript+module' ``` ### TypeScript SDK ```typescript import Cloudflare from "cloudflare"; const client
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Tool: references/workers-for-platforms/configuration.md Description: # Configuration ## Dispatch Namespace Binding ### wrangler.jsonc ```jsonc { "$schema": "./node_modules/wrangler/config-schema.json", "dispatch_namespaces": [{ "binding": "DISPATCHER", "namespace": "production" }] } ``` ## Worker Isolation Mode Workers in a namespace run in **untrusted mode** by default for security: - No access to `request.cf` object - Isolated cache per Worker (no shared cache) - `caches.default` disabled ###
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Tool: references/workers-for-platforms/gotchas.md Description: # Gotchas & Limits ## Common Errors ### "Worker not found" **Cause:** Attempting to get Worker that doesn't exist in namespace **Solution:** Catch error and return 404: ```typescript try { const userWorker = env.DISPATCHER.get(workerName); return userWorker.fetch(request); } catch (e) { if (e.message.startsWith("Worker not found")) { return new Response("Worker not found", { status: 404 }); } throw e; // Re-throw unexpected errors }
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Tool: references/workers-for-platforms/patterns.md Description: # Multi-Tenant Patterns ## Billing by Plan ```typescript interface Env { DISPATCHER: DispatchNamespace; CUSTOMERS_KV: KVNamespace; } export default { async fetch(request: Request, env: Env): Promise<Response> { const userWorkerName = new URL(request.url).hostname.split(".")[0]; const customerPlan = await env.CUSTOMERS_KV.get(userWorkerName); const plans = { enterprise: { cpuMs: 50, subRequests: 50 }, pro: { cpuMs: 20, subRequests: 2
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Tool: references/workers-playground/README.md Description: # Cloudflare Workers Playground Skill Reference ## Overview Cloudflare Workers Playground is a browser-based sandbox for instantly experimenting with, testing, and deploying Cloudflare Workers without authentication or setup.
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Tool: references/workers-playground/api.md Description: # Workers Playground API ## Handler ```javascript export default { async fetch(request, env, ctx) { // request: Request, env: {} (empty in playground), ctx: ExecutionContext return new Response('Hello'); } }; ``` ## Request ```javascript const method = request.method; // "GET", "POST" const url = new URL(request.url); // Parse URL const headers = request.headers; // Headers object const body = await request.json(); // Read bo
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Tool: references/workers-playground/configuration.md Description: # Configuration ## Getting Started Navigate to [workers.cloudflare.com/playground](https://workers.cloudflare.com/playground) - **No account required** for testing - **No CLI or local setup** needed - Code executes in real Cloudflare Workers runtime - Share code via URL (never expires) ## Playground Constraints ⚠️ **Important Limitations** | Constraint | Playground | Production Workers | |------------|------------|----------------
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Tool: references/workers-playground/gotchas.md Description: # Workers Playground Gotchas ## Platform Limitations | Limitation | Impact | Workaround | |------------|--------|------------| | Safari broken | Preview fails | Use Chrome/Firefox/Edge | | TypeScript unsupported | TS syntax errors | Write plain JS or use JSDoc | | No bindings | `env` always `{}` | Mock data or use external APIs | | No env vars | Can't access secrets | Hardcode for testing | ## Common Runtime Errors ### "Response body al
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Tool: references/workers-playground/patterns.md Description: # Workers Playground Patterns ## JSON API ```javascript export default { async fetch(request) { const url = new URL(request.url); if (url.pathname === '/api/hello') return Response.json({ message: 'Hello' }); if (url.pathname === '/api/echo' && request.method === 'POST') { return Response.json({ received: await request.json() }); } return Response.json({ error: 'Not found' }, { status: 404 }); } }; ``` ## Router Pattern ```javascript c
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Tool: references/workers-vpc/README.md Description: # Workers VPC Connectivity Connect Cloudflare Workers to private networks and internal infrastructure using TCP Sockets.
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Tool: references/workers-vpc/api.md Description: # TCP Sockets API Reference Complete API reference for the Cloudflare Workers TCP Sockets API (`cloudflare:sockets`).
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Tool: references/workers-vpc/configuration.md Description: # Configuration Setup and configuration for TCP Sockets in Cloudflare Workers.
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Tool: references/workers-vpc/gotchas.md Description: # Gotchas and Troubleshooting Common pitfalls, limitations, and solutions for TCP Sockets in Cloudflare Workers.
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Tool: references/workers-vpc/patterns.md Description: # Common Patterns Real-world patterns and examples for TCP Sockets in Cloudflare Workers.
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Tool: references/workers/README.md Description: # Cloudflare Workers Expert guidance for building, deploying, and optimizing Cloudflare Workers applications.
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Tool: references/workers/api.md Description: # Workers Runtime APIs ## Fetch Handler ```typescript export default { async fetch(request: Request, env: Env, ctx: ExecutionContext): Promise<Response> { const url = new URL(request.url); if (request.method === 'POST' && url.pathname === '/api') { const body = await request.json(); return new Response(JSON.stringify({ id: 1 }), { headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' } }); } return fetch(request); // Subrequest to origin }, }; ``` ## Executi
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Tool: references/workers/configuration.md Description: # Workers Configuration ## wrangler.jsonc (Recommended) ```jsonc { "$schema": "./node_modules/wrangler/config-schema.json", "name": "my-worker", "main": "src/index.ts", "compatibility_date": "2025-01-01", // Use current date for new projects // Bindings (non-inheritable) "vars": { "ENVIRONMENT": "production" }, "kv_namespaces": [{ "binding": "MY_KV", "id": "abc123" }], "r2_buckets": [{ "binding": "MY_BUCKET", "bucket_name": "my-bucket" }], "
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Tool: references/workers/frameworks.md Description: # Workers Frameworks ## Hono (Recommended) Workers-native web framework with excellent TypeScript support and middleware ecosystem.
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Tool: references/workers/gotchas.md Description: # Workers Gotchas ## Common Errors ### "Too much CPU time used" **Cause:** Worker exceeded CPU time limit (10ms standard, 30ms unbound) **Solution:** Use `ctx.waitUntil()` for background work, offload heavy compute to Durable Objects, or consider Workers AI for ML workloads ### "Module-Level State Lost" **Cause:** Workers are stateless between requests; module-level variables reset unpredictably **Solution:** Use KV, D1, or Durable Objects for per
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Tool: references/workers/patterns.md Description: # Workers Patterns ## Error Handling ```typescript class HTTPError extends Error { constructor(public status: number, message: string) { super(message); } } export default { async fetch(request: Request, env: Env): Promise<Response> { try { return await handleRequest(request, env); } catch (error) { if (error instanceof HTTPError) { return new Response(JSON.stringify({ error: error.message }), { status: error.status, headers: { 'Content-Type': 'a
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Tool: references/workflows/README.md Description: # Cloudflare Workflows Durable multi-step applications with automatic retries, state persistence, and long-running execution.
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Tool: references/workflows/api.md Description: # Workflow APIs ## Step APIs ```typescript // step.do() const result = await step.do('step name', async () => { /* logic */ }); const result = await step.do('step name', { retries, timeout }, async () => {}); // step.sleep() await step.sleep('description', '1 hour'); await step.sleep('description', 5000); // ms // step.sleepUntil() await step.sleepUntil('description', Date.parse('2024-12-31')); // step.waitForEvent() const data = await step.waitForE
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Tool: references/workflows/configuration.md Description: # Workflow Configuration ## wrangler.jsonc Setup ```jsonc { "name": "my-worker", "main": "src/index.ts", "compatibility_date": "2025-01-01", // Use current date for new projects "observability": { "enabled": true // Enables Workflows dashboard + structured logs }, "workflows": [ { "name": "my-workflow", // Workflow name "binding": "MY_WORKFLOW", // Env binding "class_name": "MyWorkflow" // TS class name // "script_n
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Tool: references/workflows/gotchas.md Description: # Gotchas & Debugging ## Common Errors ### "Step Timeout" **Cause:** Step execution exceeding 10 minute default timeout or configured timeout **Solution:** Set custom timeout with `step.do('long operation', {timeout: '30 minutes'}, async () => {...})` or increase CPU limit in wrangler.jsonc (max 5min CPU time) ### "waitForEvent Timeout" **Cause:** Event not received within timeout period (default 24h, max 365d) **Solution:** Wrap in try-catch to
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Tool: references/workflows/patterns.md Description: # Workflow Patterns ## Image Processing Pipeline ```typescript export class ImageProcessingWorkflow extends WorkflowEntrypoint<Env, Params> { async run(event, step) { const imageData = await step.do('fetch', async () => (await this.env.BUCKET.get(event.params.imageKey)).arrayBuffer()); const description = await step.do('generate description', async () => await this.env.AI.run('@cf/llava-hf/llava-1.5-7b-hf', {image: Array.from(new Uint8Array(ima
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Tool: references/wrangler/README.md Description: # Cloudflare Wrangler Official CLI for Cloudflare Workers - develop, manage, and deploy Workers from the command line.
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Tool: references/wrangler/api.md Description: # Wrangler Programmatic API Node.js APIs for testing and development.
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Tool: references/wrangler/auth.md Description: # Authentication Authenticate with Cloudflare before deploying Workers or Pages.
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Tool: references/wrangler/configuration.md Description: # Wrangler Configuration Configuration reference for wrangler.jsonc (recommended).
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Tool: references/wrangler/gotchas.md Description: # Wrangler Common Issues ## Common Errors ### "Binding ID vs name mismatch" **Cause:** Confusion between binding name (code) and resource ID **Solution:** Bindings use `binding` (code name) and `id`/`database_id`/`bucket_name` (resource ID).
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Tool: references/wrangler/patterns.md Description: # Wrangler Development Patterns Common workflows and best practices.
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Tool: references/zaraz/IMPLEMENTATION_SUMMARY.md Description: # Zaraz Reference Implementation Summary ## Files Created | File | Lines | Purpose | |------|-------|---------| | README.md | 111 | Navigation, decision tree, quick start | | api.md | 287 | Web API reference, Zaraz Context | | configuration.md | 307 | Dashboard setup, triggers, tools, consent | | patterns.md | 430 | SPA, e-commerce, Worker integration | | gotchas.md | 317 | Troubleshooting, limits, tool-specific issues | | **Total** |
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Tool: references/zaraz/README.md Description: # Cloudflare Zaraz Expert guidance for Cloudflare Zaraz - server-side tag manager for loading third-party tools at the edge.
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Tool: references/zaraz/api.md Description: # Zaraz Web API Client-side JavaScript API for tracking events, setting properties, and managing consent.
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Tool: references/zaraz/configuration.md Description: # Zaraz Configuration ## Dashboard Setup 1.
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Tool: references/zaraz/gotchas.md Description: # Zaraz Gotchas ## Events Not Firing **Check:** 1.
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Tool: references/zaraz/patterns.md Description: # Zaraz Patterns ## SPA Tracking **History Change Trigger (Recommended):** Configure in dashboard - no code needed, Zaraz auto-detects route changes.