review-gitcode-pr
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 26, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes Python scripts to orchestrate interactions with the local repository and the GitCode platform.\n
- Evidence: The
collect_pr_context.pyandprepare_review_submission.pyscripts call thegitandoh-gcbinaries using thesubprocess.runfunction.\n - Risk: Standard automation behavior; however, the risk is minimized by passing arguments as lists rather than shell strings, preventing shell injection vulnerabilities.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is subject to indirect prompt injection because it processes data provided by external users in the context of a pull request.\n
- Ingestion points: Pull request titles, descriptions, and comments are fetched via
oh-gcand saved topr-view.jsonandpr-comments.json, which the agent is then instructed to read.\n - Boundary markers: The skill's instructions (SKILL.md) do not establish clear delimiters or provide instructions to the agent to disregard commands embedded within the fetched PR content.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill enables the agent to read local source files and use the
oh-gctool to post comments or approve pull requests based on the processed data.\n - Sanitization: The scripts do not perform sanitization or filtering of the remote content before it is ingested into the agent's context.
Audit Metadata