opper-cli
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- Privilege Escalation (HIGH): The installation instructions for macOS ARM64 suggest using
sudo curlto download a binary directly into/usr/local/binandsudo chmodto make it executable. This grants the installation process and the resulting binary elevated system permissions. - External Downloads & Remote Code Execution (HIGH): The skill directs users to download and execute pre-compiled binaries from a non-whitelisted GitHub organization (
opper-ai). Executing unverified binaries from external sources poses a significant risk of remote code execution. - Indirect Prompt Injection (HIGH):
- Ingestion points: The
opper callandopper functions chatcommands ingest data directly from command-line arguments andstdinpipes inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: No boundary markers or delimiters are used to separate user-provided data from system instructions.
- Capability inventory: The CLI possesses capabilities to modify knowledge base indexes, register models, and execute traces as documented in the Commands Overview.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of input sanitization or validation of the data being passed to the AI functions, making it vulnerable to malicious instructions embedded in input data.
- Credentials Unsafe (MEDIUM): The
opper models createcommand example shows an API key being passed as a raw command-line argument. This is a poor security practice as it leaves sensitive credentials in the user's shell history (e.g.,~/.bash_history) and process metadata.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata