opper-cli

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • Privilege Escalation (HIGH): The installation instructions for macOS ARM64 suggest using sudo curl to download a binary directly into /usr/local/bin and sudo chmod to make it executable. This grants the installation process and the resulting binary elevated system permissions.
  • External Downloads & Remote Code Execution (HIGH): The skill directs users to download and execute pre-compiled binaries from a non-whitelisted GitHub organization (opper-ai). Executing unverified binaries from external sources poses a significant risk of remote code execution.
  • Indirect Prompt Injection (HIGH):
  • Ingestion points: The opper call and opper functions chat commands ingest data directly from command-line arguments and stdin pipes in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: No boundary markers or delimiters are used to separate user-provided data from system instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The CLI possesses capabilities to modify knowledge base indexes, register models, and execute traces as documented in the Commands Overview.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of input sanitization or validation of the data being passed to the AI functions, making it vulnerable to malicious instructions embedded in input data.
  • Credentials Unsafe (MEDIUM): The opper models create command example shows an API key being passed as a raw command-line argument. This is a poor security practice as it leaves sensitive credentials in the user's shell history (e.g., ~/.bash_history) and process metadata.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 16, 2026, 10:34 AM