opper-node-agents

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
  • REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION (HIGH): In references/TOOLS.md, the skill provides an example of an evaluate tool that uses the Function() constructor to execute a string (expression). This pattern allows an LLM to generate and execute arbitrary JavaScript code within the Node.js environment, presenting a severe risk if the agent's input or tool chain is compromised.
  • COMMAND_EXECUTION (HIGH): The MCP integration documented in references/MCP.md allows agents to execute arbitrary system commands via the MCPconfig function's command and args parameters. Provided examples demonstrate using npx to download and run remote code (@modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystem) and docker for containerized execution.
  • DATA_EXFILTRATION (MEDIUM): The skill provides pre-configured patterns for deep filesystem and database access. While intended for utility, these tools allow an agent to read sensitive local files (e.g., via server-filesystem) which can then be exfiltrated through standard LLM output or other network-enabled tools.
  • INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION (LOW): The framework is designed to ingest and process untrusted external data which creates an injection surface.
  • Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent via agent.run() input and tool outputs like fetch_url or search_web documented in references/TOOLS.md.
  • Boundary markers: Examples lack explicit boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded commands in tool outputs.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has access to powerful capabilities including subprocess execution (MCPconfig), filesystem reads, and dynamic JS execution.
  • Sanitization: No evidence of sanitization or escaping of external content before it is processed by the reasoning loop.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 17, 2026, 06:26 PM