quick-fix-suggestion
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 19, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill documentation explicitly provides patterns to locate sensitive files containing credentials or secrets.
- Evidence: The file
references/TOOL_REFERENCE.mdincludes the patternglob('**/.env*', { cwd: repoPath })under the 'Find Configuration Files' section. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection due to the ingestion of untrusted data from Gitee issues and comments.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context via
get_repo_issue_detailandlist_issue_commentstools as described inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: There are no delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the ingested issue data.
- Capability inventory: The agent has access to
bash,read,grep, andast_grep_searchtools (detailed inSKILL.mdandreferences/TOOL_REFERENCE.md). - Sanitization: No evidence of sanitization, escaping, or validation of the external content is provided.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
bashtool to execute shell commands for repository history analysis. - Evidence:
references/TOOL_REFERENCE.mdincludes a code snippet for executinggit logvia thebashtool.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata